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Abstract
Some of the recent blockchain proposals, such as Stellar and Ripple, allow for open membership
while using quorum-like structures typical for classical Byzantine consensus with closed membership.
This is achieved by constructing quorums in a decentralised way: each participant independently
chooses whom to trust, and quorums arise from these individual decisions. Unfortunately, the
consensus protocols underlying such blockchains are poorly understood, and their correctness has
not been rigorously investigated. In this paper we rigorously prove correct the Stellar Consensus
Protocol (SCP), with our proof giving insights into the protocol structure and its use of lower-level
abstractions. To this end, we first propose an abstract version of SCP that uses as a black box
Stellar’s federated voting primitive (analogous to reliable Byzantine broadcast), previously invest-
igated by García-Pérez and Gotsman [7]. The abstract consensus protocol highlights a modular
structure in Stellar and can be proved correct by reusing the previous results on federated voting.
However, it is unsuited for realistic implementations, since its processes maintain infinite state. We
thus establish a refinement between the abstract protocol and the concrete SCP that uses only finite
state, thereby carrying over the result about the correctness of former to the latter. Our results help
establish the theoretical foundations of decentralised blockchains like Stellar and gain confidence in
their correctness.
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1 Introduction
Permissioned blockchains are becoming increasingly popular due to the low-energy consump-
tion and hard guarantees they provide on when a transaction can be considered successfully
committed. Such blockchains are often based on classical Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT)
consensus protocols, like PBFT [4]. In these protocols consensus is reached once a quorum
of participants agrees on the same decision. Quorums can be defined as sets containing
enough nodes in the system (e.g., 2f +1 out of 3f +1, assuming at most f failures) or by a
more general structure of a Byzantine quorum system (BQS) [12]. Unfortunately, defining
quorums in this way requires fixing the number of participants in the system, which prevents
decentralisation.
Some of the recent blockchain proposals, such as Stellar [13] and Ripple [15], allow
for open membership while using quorum-like structures typical for classical Byzantine con-
sensus with closed membership. This is achieved by constructing quorums in a decentralised
way: each protocol participant independently chooses whom to trust, and quorums arise from
these individual decisions. In particular, in Stellar trust assumptions are specified using a
federated Byzantine quorum system (FBQS), where each participant selects a set of quorum
slices—sets of nodes each of which would convince the participant to accept the validity of
a given statement (§2). Quorums are defined as sets of nodes U such that each node in U
has some quorum slice fully within U , so that the nodes in a quorum can potentially reach
an agreement. Consensus is then implemented by a fairly intricate protocol whose key com-
ponent is federated voting—a protocol similar to Bracha’s protocol for reliable Byzantine
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broadcast [1, 2]. Unfortunately, even though Stellar has been deployed as a functioning
blockchain, the structure of the consensus protocol underlying it is poorly understood and
its correctness has not been rigorously investigated. In this paper we aim to close this gap,
rigorously defining and proving correct the Stellar Consensus Protocol (SCP). Apart from
giving more confidence in the correctness of the protocol, our proof is structured in such a
way as to give insights into its structure and its use of lower-level abstractions.
In more detail, the guarantees provided by SCP are nontrivial. When different parti-
cipants in an FBQS choose different slices, only a subset of the participants may take part
in a subsystem in which every two quorums intersect in a correct node—a property required
for achieving consensus. The system may partition into such subsystems, and SCP will
guarantee agreement within each of them. In blockchain terms, the blockchain may fork,
but in this case each fork will be internally consistent, a property that is enough for busi-
ness applications of the Stellar blockchain. The subsystems where agreement is guaranteed
are characterised by Mazières et al. [14] through the notion of intact sets. Our proof of
correctness establishes safety and liveness properties of SCP relative to such intact sets (§3).
As a stepping stone in the proof, we first propose an abstract version of SCP that uses as
a black box Stellar’s federated voting primitive (analogous to reliable Byzantine broadcast)
previously investigated by García-Pérez and Gotsman [7] (§5). This abstract formulation
allows specifying the protocol concisely and highlights the modular structure present in it.
This allows proving the protocol by reusing the previous results on federated voting [7] (re-
viewed in §4). However, the abstract protocol is unsuited for realistic implementations, since
its processes maintain infinite state. To address this, we formulate a realistic version of the
protocol—a concrete SCP—that uses only finite state. We then prove a refinement between
the abstract and concrete SCP, thereby carrying over the result about the correctness of
former to the latter (§6).
A subtlety in SCP is that its participants receive information about quorum slices of
other participants directly from them. Hence, Byzantine participants may lie to others
about their choices of quorum slices, which may cause different participants to disagree on
what constitutes a quorum. Our results also cover this realistic case (§7).
Overall, our results help establish the theoretical foundations of decentralised blockchains
like Stellar and gain confidence in their correctness. Proofs of the lemmas and theorems in
the paper are given in the appendices.
2 Background: SystemModel and Federated Byzantine Quorum Systems
System model. We consider a system consisting of a finite universe of nodes V and
assume a Byzantine failure model where faulty nodes can deviate arbitrarily from their
specification. All other nodes are called correct. Nodes that are correct, or that only deviate
from their specification by stopping execution, are called honest. Nodes that deviate from
their specification in ways other than stopping are called malicious. We assume that any two
nodes can communicate over an authenticated perfect link. We assume a partial synchronous
network, which guarantees that messages arrive within bounded time after some unknown,
finite global stabilisation time (GST). Each node has a local timer and a timeout service
that can be initialised with an arbitrary delay ∆. We assume that after GST the clock
skew of correct nodes is bounded, i.e., after GST two correct nodes can only disagree in the
duration of a given delay ∆ by a bounded margin.
Federated Byzantine quorum systems. Given a finite universeV of nodes, a federated
Byzantine quorum system (FBQS) [7, 13] is a function S : V → 22
V
\ {∅} that specifies a
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non-empty set of quorum slices for each node, ranged over by q. We require that a node
belongs to all of its own quorum slices: ∀v ∈ V. ∀q ∈ S(v). v ∈ q. Quorum slices reflect the
trust choices of each node. A non-empty set of nodes U ⊆ V is a quorum in an FBQS S iff
U contains a slice for each member, i.e., ∀v ∈ U. ∃q ∈ S(v). q ⊆ U .
For simplicity, for now we assume that faulty nodes do not equivocate about their quorum
slices, so that all the nodes share the same FBQS. In §7 we consider the more realistic
subjective FBQS [7], where malicious nodes may lie about their slices and different nodes
have different views on the FBQS. There we also lift the results on the subsequent sections
of the paper to subjective FBQSes.
◮ Example 1. Consider a universe V with 3f+1 nodes, and consider the FBQS S where for
every node v ∈ V, the set of slices S(v) consists of every set of 2f +1 nodes that contains v
itself. S encodes the classical cardinality-based quorum system of 3f + 1 nodes with failure
threshold f , since every set of 2f + 1 or more nodes is a quorum.
◮ Example 2. Let the universe V contain four nodes v1 to v4, and consider the FBQS S in
the diagram below.
v1
v2
v3
v4
S(v1) = {{v1, v2}}
S(v2) = {{v1, v2}, {v2, v3}}
S(v3) = {{v3}}
S(v4) = {{v4}}
For each node, all the outgoing arrows with the same style determine one slice. Node v2
has two slices, determined by the solid and dashed arrow styles respectively. The rest of the
nodes have one slice. S has the following set of quorums Q =
{{v1, v2}, {v2, v3}, {v3}, {v4}, {v1, v2, v3}, {v3, v4}, {v1, v2, v4}, {v2, v3, v4}, {v1, v2, v3, v4}}.
A consensus protocol that runs on top of an FBQS may not guarantee global agreement,
because when nodes choose slices independently, only a subset of the nodes may take part
in a subsystem in which every two quorums intersect in at least one correct node—a basic
requirement of a Byzantine quorum system [12] to ensure agreement. To formalise which
parts of the system may reach agreement internally, we borrow the notions of intertwined
nodes and of intact set from [14]. Two nodes v1 and v2 are intertwined iff they are correct
and every quorum containing v1 intersects every quorum containing v2 in at least one correct
node. Consider an FBQS S and a set of nodes I. The projection S|I of S to I is the FBQS
over universe I given by S|I(v) = {q ∩ I | q ∈ S(v)}. For a given set of faulty nodes, a set I
is an intact set iff I is a quorum in S and every member of I is intertwined with each other
in the projected FBQS S|I . The intact sets characterise those sets of nodes that can reach
consensus, which we later show using the following auxiliary result.
◮ Lemma 3. Let S be an FBQS and assume some set of faulty nodes. Let I be an intact
set in S and consider any two quorums U1 and U2 in S such that U1 ∩ I 6= ∅ and U2 ∩ I 6= ∅.
Then the intersection U1 ∩ U2 contains some node in I.
The maximal intact sets are disjoint with each other:
◮ Lemma 4. Let S be an FBQS and assume some set of faulty nodes. Let I1 and I2 be two
intact sets in S. If I1 ∩ I2 6= ∅ then I1 ∪ I2 is an intact set in S.
4 Deconstructing Stellar Consensus
In SCP the system may split into different partitions—i.e., the maximal intact sets—that
may be inconsistent with each other, but which constitute independent systems each of
which can reach consensus.
Consider the S from Example 1, which encodes the cardinality-based quorum system of
3f + 1 nodes, and let f = 1, so that the universe V contains four nodes v1 to v4. If we
assume that node v3 is faulty, then the set I = {v1, v2, v4} is the only maximal intact set:
I is a quorum in S, and S|I contains the quorums {{v1, v2}, {v2, v4}, {v1, v4}, {v1, v2, v4}},
which enjoy quorum intersection. This ensures that every two nodes in I are intertwined in
the projected system S|I .
Now consider the S from Example 2. If we assume that node v3 is faulty, then the sets
I = {v1, v2} and I ′ = {v4} are the maximal intact sets: I and I ′ are quorums in S, and the
projected systems S|I and S|I′ enjoy quorum intersection—SI contains quorums {v1, v2}
and {v2}, and S|I′ contains quorum {v4}—which ensures that every two nodes in either I
or I ′ are intertwined in the projected systems S|I and SI′ respectively. It is easy to check
that adding any set of correct nodes to either I or I ′ results in sets that are not quorums in
S, or in projected systems that contain some pairs of nodes that are not intertwined.
3 Specifications
Assume a set Val of consensus values. In the consensus protocols that we study in §5–6,
each correct node proposes some x ∈ Val through an invocation propose(x), and each node
may decide some x′ ∈ Val through an indication decide(x′). We consider a variant of the
weak Byzantine consensus specification in [2] that we call non-blocking Byzantine consensus
for intact sets, which is defined as follows. Given a maximal intact set I,
(Integrity) no correct node decides twice,
(Agreement for intact sets) no two nodes in I decide differently,
(Weak validity for intact sets) if all nodes are honest and every node proposes x, then no
node in I decides a consensus value different from x; furthermore, if all nodes are honest
and some node in I decides x, then x was proposed by some node, and
(Non-blocking for intact sets) if a node v in I has not yet decided in some run of the protocol,
then for every continuation of that run in which all the malicious nodes stop, node v
eventually decides some consensus value.
The usual Weak validity property of consensus [2] ensures that if all nodes are correct and
they propose the same consensus value, then no node can decide a consensus value different
from the proposed one; and that if all nodes are correct, then a node can only decide a
consensus value proposed by some node. OurWeak validity for intact sets above adapts this
requirement to the nodes in a maximal intact set, and weakens its condition by assuming
that all nodes are honest instead of correct. Notice that if every two quorums intersect our
property entails the usual one because a correct node is also honest, and because if all nodes
are correct then the maximal intact set is the universe. For instance, this condition holds in
the cardinality-based quorum systems (3f + 1).
The consensus protocols we consider in this paper specify the behaviour of SCP’s ballot
protocol [13, 14] with one of its suggested strategies for managing timeouts (Strategy 1
from [14]). As discussed in [14], in SCP malicious nodes with good network timing could
permanently delay the termination of the nodes in an intact set, and thus the protocol does
not provide the usualTermination guarantee that every correct node eventually decides some
consensus value [2]. Instead, we consider the weaker liveness guarantee of Non-blocking for
intact sets, which we have obtained by adapting the Non-blocking property in [16]. Non-
blocking requires that some continuation of a given run exists in which every correct node
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terminates. Our Non-blocking for intact sets adapts this requirement to the nodes in a
maximal intact set, and requires that they terminate in every continuation of the run in
which malicious nodes are stopped. It is easy to check that if every correct node is in an
intact set, then Non-blocking for intact sets entails Non-blocking in [16]. For instance, this
condition holds in the cardinality-based quorum systems (3f + 1). Besides, if every correct
node is honest, then Non-blocking for intact sets entails the usual Termination property that
guarantees that every correct node eventually decides some consensus value.
The non-blocking Byzantine consensus for intact sets above entails the weak Byzantine
consensus specification [2] in the cardinality-based quorum systems (3f + 1), which guar-
antees the Integrity property above, as well as the usual Agreement property that ensures
that no two correct nodes decide differently, and the usual Weak validity and Termination
properties that we have recalled in the paragraphs above.
One of the core components of the consensus protocol in §5 is federating voting (FV )
[13, 14]. Assume a set of voting values A that could be disjoint with the setVal of consensus
values (we typically letA be the set of Booleans Bool ≡ {true, false}). FV allows each correct
node to vote for some a ∈ A through an invocation vote(a), and each node may deliver some
a′ ∈ A through an indication deliver(a′). The interface of FV is akin to that of consensus,
where each node activates itself through the primitive vote(a). However, FV has weaker
liveness guarantees than consensus, which are reminiscent to those of Byzantine reliable
broadcast from [2] and weakly reliable Byzantine broadcast from [7]. Here, we consider a
variant of the latter specification that we call reliable Byzantine voting for intact sets, which
is defined as follows. Given a maximal intact set I,
(No duplication) every correct node delivers at most one voting value,
(Totality for intact sets) if a node in I delivers a voting value, then every node in I eventu-
ally delivers a voting value,
(Consistency for intertwined nodes) if two intertwined nodes v and v′ deliver a and a′ re-
spectively, then a = a′, and
(Validity for intact sets) if all nodes in I vote for a, then all nodes in I eventually deliver a.
The ability of each node to activate itself independently in the specification above simu-
lates a malicious sender that may send different voting values to each node in the specification
of weakly reliable Byzantine broadcast from [7].
4 Federated Voting
In this section we recall federated voting (FV ) from [13], which also corresponds to the
Stellar broadcast considered in [7]. We prove that FV implements the specification of reliable
Byzantine voting for intact sets, thereby generalising the results of [7] to the case of multiple
intact sets within the system. The consensus protocol that we study in the next section uses
multiple instances of FV independent from each other. This is done by letting each node
run a distinct process for each instance of FV, which is identified by a tag t from some
designated set Tag of tags.
Algorithm 1 below depicts FV over an FBQS S with set of quorums Q. A node v runs a
process federated-voting(v, t) for each tag t. The messages exchanged by such a process are
also tagged with t, in order to distinguish them from the messages exchanged for instances
of FV associated with tags different from t.
FV adapts Bracha’s protocol for reliable Byzantine broadcast [1], which works over the
cardinality-based quorum systems of 3f + 1 nodes, to the federated setting of the FBQSs.
In FV nodes process each other’s messages in several stages, where for each tag t progress
is denoted by several Boolean flags (line 2 of Algorithm 1). When a node v votes a for tag
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Algorithm 1: Federated voting (FV) over an FBQS S with set of quorums Q.
1 process federated-voting(v ∈ V, t ∈ Tag)
2 voted, ready, delivered ← false ∈ Bool;
3 vote(a)
4 if not voted then
5 voted ← true;
6 send VOTE(t, a) to every v′ ∈ V;
7 when received VOTE(t, a) from every u ∈ U for some U ∈ Q such that v ∈ U
and not ready
8 ready ← true;
9 send READY(t, a) to every v′ ∈ V;
10 when received READY(t, a) from every u ∈ B for some v-blocking B and not
ready
11 ready ← true;
12 send READY(t, a) to every v′ ∈ V;
13 when received READY(t, a) from every u ∈ U for some U ∈ Q such that
v ∈ U and not delivered
14 delivered ← true;
15 trigger deliver(a);
t for the first time, the node sends VOTE(t, a) to every node (including itself, for uniformity;
lines 3–6). When a node v receives a VOTE(t, a) message from a quorum to which v itself
belongs, it sends a READY(t, a) message to every node, signalling its willingness to deliver
the value a for tag t (lines 7–9). Note that, for each tag t, two nodes in the same intact set
I cannot send READY messages with two different voting values through the rule in lines 7–
9. Indeed, this would require two quorums of VOTE messages, each with a node in I, with
different voting values for the same tag. But by Lemma 3 these quorums would intersect in
a node in I, which is by definition correct and cannot send contradictory VOTE messages for
the same tag. When a node v receives the message READY(t, a) from a quorum to which v
itself belongs, it delivers a for tag t (lines 13–15).
The exchange of READY messages in the protocol is necessary to establish liveness guar-
antees. It ensures that, if a node in an intact set I delivers a voting value for some tag,
other nodes in I have enough information to also deliver a voting value for the same tag.
This relies on the rule in lines 10–12, which uses the notion of v-blocking set [13]. Given a
node v, a set B is v-blocking iff B overlaps each of v’s slices, i.e., ∀q ∈ S(v). q ∩B 6= ∅. (To
illustrate this notion, in Example 1 every set of f + 1 nodes is v-blocking for every v, and
in Example 2 the set {v1, v3} is v2-blocking and the set {v2} is v1-blocking.) Lines 10–12
allow a node to send a READY(t, a) message even if it previously voted for a different voting
value for tag t: this is done if v receives READY(t, a) from each member of a v-blocking set.
If v is in an intact set I, the following lemma guarantees that in this case v has received at
least one READY(t, a) message from some node in I.
◮ Lemma 5. Let S be an FBQS and assume a set of faulty nodes. Let I be an intact set in
S and v ∈ I. Then, no v-blocking set B exists such that B ∩ I = ∅.
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Node v1 Node v2 Node v3 Node v4
vote(false) vote(false) vote(true)
VOTE(t, false) VOTE(t, false) VOTE(t, false) VOTE(t, true)
READY(t, false) READY(t, false)
READY(t, false)
deliver(false) deliver(false) deliver(false)
Figure 1 Execution of the instance of FV for tag t.
By Lemma 5, the first node in I to ever send a READY(t, a) message for a tag t has to do it
through the rule in lines 7–9, and hence the value a has been cross-checked by a quorum.
If the condition v ∈ U in lines 7 and 13 of Algorithm 1 was dropped, this could violate
Agreement for intact sets as follows. Take the S from Example 2 and consider a run of
FV for some tag t where v3 is malicious. Node v3 could respectively send READY(t, a) and
READY(t, a′) with a 6= a′ to correct nodes v1 and v2. Since {v3} ∈ Q, these nodes will
respectively deliver a and a′ by lines 13–15 of Algorithm 1 without condition v ∈ U .
Our first contribution is to generalise the results of [7] to establish the correctness of FV
within each of the maximal intact sets of an FBQS, as captured by Theorem 6 below.
◮ Theorem 6. Let S be an FBQS and t be a tag. The instance for t of FV over S satisfies
the specification of reliable Byzantine voting for intact sets.
FV also guarantees the property stated by the following lemma, which helps establish
the liveness properties of the consensus protocol that we introduce in §5.
◮ Lemma 7. Let S be an FBQS and t be a tag. Consider an execution of the instance for t
of FV over S. Let I be an intact set in S and assume that GST has expired. If a node v ∈ I
delivers a voting value then every node in I will deliver a voting value within bounded time.
We write δI for the time that a node in I takes to deliver some voting value after GST
and provided that some other node in I already delivered some voting value. The delay
δI—which is determined by S and I—is unknown, but Lemma 7 guarantees that it is finite.
◮ Example 8. Consider the S from Example 1, which encodes the cardinality-based quorum
system 3f + 1, and let f = 1 such that the universe V contains four nodes v1 to v4. Every
set of three or more nodes is a quorum, and every set of two or more nodes is v-blocking
for every v ∈ V. Let us fix a tag t and consider an execution of the instance of FV for
tag t where we let the voting values be the Booleans. Assume that nodes v1, v2 and v4 are
correct, which constitute the maximal intact set. In the execution, nodes v1 and v2 vote
false, and node v4 votes true. Malicious node v3 sends the message VOTE(t, false) to every
node (highlighted in red) thus helping the correct nodes to deliver false.
Figure 1 depicts a possible execution of FV described above, from which a trace can be
constructed as follows: all the events in each row may happen concurrently, and any two
events in different rows happen in real time, where time increases downwards; in those cells
that are tagged with a message, the node sends the message to every node, and in a given
cell a node has received all the messages from every node in the rows above it. (These con-
ventions are only for presentational purposes, and should not be mistaken with the perfectly
synchronised round-based model of [5], which we do not use.) The quorum {v1, v2, v3} sends
VOTE(t, false) to every node, which makes nodes v1 and v2 send READY(t, false) to every node
through lines 7–9 of Algorithm 1. However, there exists not a quorum U such that v4 ∈ U
and every member of U sends a message VOTE(t, a) with the same Boolean a, and thus node
8 Deconstructing Stellar Consensus
v4 sends READY(t, false) through lines 10–12 of Algorithm 1, only after receiving correspond-
ing ready messages from the v4-blocking set {v1, v2}. Observe how node v4 changes its
original vote true and sends false in the READY message. After every correct node receives
READY(t, false) from the quorum {v1, v2, v4}, they all deliver false.
5 Abstract Stellar Consensus Protocol
In this section we introduce the abstract SCP (ASCP), which concisely specifies the mech-
anism of SCP [13, 14] and highlights the modular structure present in it1. Like Paxos [9],
ASCP uses ballots—pairs 〈n, x〉, where n ∈ N+ a natural positive round number and x ∈ Val
a consensus value. We assume that Val is totally ordered, and we consider a special null
ballot 〈0,⊥〉 and let Ballot = (N+×Val)∪{〈0,⊥〉} be the set of ballots. (We write b.n and
b.x respectively for the round and consensus value of ballot b.) The set Ballot is totally
ordered, where we let b < b′ iff either b.n < b′.n, or b.n = b′.n and b.x < b′.x.
To better convey SCP’s mechanism, we let the abstract protocol use FV as a black box
where nodes may hold a binary vote on each of the ballots: we let the set of voting values
V be the set of Booleans and the set of tags Tag be the set of ballots, and let the protocol
consider a separate instance of FV for each ballot. A node voting for a Boolean a for a
ballot b that carries the consensus value b.x encodes the aim to either abort the ballot (when
a = false) or to commit it (when a = true) thus deciding the consensus value b.x. From now
on we will unambiguously use ‘Booleans’, ‘ballots’ and ‘values’ instead of ‘voting values’,
‘tags’ and ‘consensus values’, respectively.
We have dubbed ASCP ‘abstract’ because, although it specifies the protocol concisely, it
is unsuited for realistic implementations. On the one hand, each node v maintains infinite
state, because it stores a process federated-voting(v, b) for each of the infinitely many ballots b
in the array ballots (line 2 of Algorithm 2). On the other hand, each node v may need to
send or receive an infinite number of messages in order to progress (lines 6, 8, 15 and 21 of
Algorithm 2, which are explained in the detailed description of ASCP below). This is done by
assuming a batched network semantics (BNS) in which the network exchanges batches, which
are (possibly infinite) sequences of messages, instead of exchanging individual messages: the
sequence of messages to be sent by a node when processing an event is batched per recipient,
and each batch is sent at once after the atomic processing of the event; once a batch is
received, the recipient node atomically processes all the messages in the batch in sequential
order. By convention, we let the statement forall in lines 7 and 21 of Algorithm 2 consider
the ballots b′ in ascending ballot order. In §6 we introduce a ‘concrete’ version of SCP that
is amenable to implementation, since nodes in it maintain finite state and exchange a finite
number of messages; however, this version does not use FV as a black box.
ASCP uses the following below-and-incompatible-than relation on ballots. We say bal-
lots b and b′ are compatible (written b ∼ b′) iff b.x = b′.x, and incompatible (written b 6∼ b′)
otherwise, where we let ⊥ 6= x for any x ∈ Val. We say ballot b is below and incompatible
than ballot b′ (written b  b′) iff b < b′ and b 6∼ b′. In a nutshell, ASCP works as follows:
each node uses FV to prepare a ballot b which carries the candidate value b.x, this is, it
aborts every ballot b′  b, which prevents any attempt to decide a value different from b.x
at a round smaller than b.n; once b is prepared, the node uses FV again to commit ballot b,
thus deciding the candidate value b.x.
1 More precisely, in this paper we focus on Stellar’s core balloting protocol, which aims to achieve con-
sensus. We abstract from Stellar’s nomination protocol—which tries to converge (best-effort) on a
value to propose—by assuming arbitrary proposals to consensus.
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Algorithm 2: Abstract SCP (ASCP) over an FBQS S with set of quorums Q.
1 process abstract-consensus(v ∈ V)
2 ballots ← [new process federated-voting(v, b)]b∈Ballot;
3 candidate, prepared ← 〈0,⊥〉 ∈ Ballot;
4 round ← 0 ∈ N+ ∪ {0};
5 propose(x)
6 candidate ← 〈1, x〉;
7 for all b′  candidate do ballots[b′].vote(false);
8 when triggered ballots[b′].deliver(false) for every b′  b and prepared < b
9 prepared ← b;
10 if candidate ≤ prepared then
11 candidate ← prepared;
12 ballots[candidate].vote(true);
13 when triggered ballots[b].deliver(true)
14 trigger decide(b.x);
15 when exists U ∈ Q such that v ∈ U and for each u ∈ U exist
Mu ∈ {VOTE, READY} and bu ∈ Ballot such that round < bu.n and either
received Mu(bu, true) from u or received Mu(b′, false) from u for every
b′ ∈ [zu, bu) with zu < bu
16 round ← min{bu.n | u ∈ U};
17 start-timer(F (round));
18 when triggered timeout
19 if prepared = 〈0,⊥〉 then candidate ← 〈round + 1, candidate.x〉;
20 else candidate ← 〈round + 1, prepared.x〉;
21 for all b′  candidate do ballots[b′].vote(false);
ASCP is depicted in Algorithm 2 above. We assume that each node v creates a process
federated-voting(v, b) for each ballot b, which is stored in the infinite array ballots[b] (line 2).
The node keeps fields candidate and prepared, which respectively contain the ballot that v
is trying to commit and the highest ballot prepared so far. Both candidate and prepared
are initialised to the null ballot (line 3). The node also keeps a field round that contains
the current round, initialised to 0 (line 4). Once v proposes a value x, the node assigns the
ballot 〈1, x〉 to candidate and tries to prepare it by invoking FV’s primitive vote(false) for
each ballot below and incompatible than candidate (lines 5–7). This may involve sending an
infinite number of messages, which by BNS requires sending finitely many batches. Once v
prepares some ballot b by receiving FV’s indication deliver(false) for every ballot below and
incompatible than b, and if b exceeds prepared, the node updates prepared to b (lines 8–9).
The condition in line 8 may concern an infinite number of ballots, but it may hold after
receiving a finite number of batches by BNS. If prepared reaches or exceeds candidate, then
the node updates candidate to prepared, and tries to commit it by voting true for that ballot
(lines 10–12). Once v commits some ballot b by receiving FV’s indication deliver(true) for
ballot b, the node decides the value b.x (lines 13–14) and stops execution.
If the candidate ballot of a node v can no longer be aborted nor committed, then v resorts
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to a timeout mechanism that we describe next. The primitive start-timer(∆) starts the node’s
local timer, such that a timeout event will be triggered once the specified delay ∆ has expired.
(Invoking start-timer(∆′) while the timer is already running has the effect of restarting the
timer with the new delay ∆′.) In order to start the timer, a node v needs to receive, from
each member of a quorum that contains v itself, messages that endorse either committing or
preparing ballots with rounds bigger than round (line 15 of Algorithm 2). Since the domain
of values can be infinite, the condition in line 15 requires that for each node u in some
quorum U that contains v itself, there exists a ballot bu with round bu.n > round, and either
v receives from u a message endorsing to commit bu, or otherwise v receives from u messages
endorsing to abort every ballot in some non-empty, right-open interval [zu, bu), whose upper
bound is bu. This condition may require receiving an infinite number of ballots, but it may
hold after receiving a finite number of batches by BNS. Once the condition in line 15 holds,
the node updates round to the smallest n such that every member of the quorum endorses
to either commit or prepare some ballot with round bigger or equal than n, and (re-)starts
the timer with delay F (round), where F is an unbound function that doubles its value with
each increment of n (lines 16–17). If the candidate ballot can no longer be aborted or
committed, then timeout will be eventually triggered (line 18) and the node considers a new
candidate ballot with the current round increased by one, and with the value candidate.x if
the node never prepared any ballot yet (line 19) or the value prepared.x otherwise (line 20).
Then v tries to prepare the new candidate ballot by voting false for each ballot below and
incompatible than it (line 21). This may involve sending an infinite number of messages,
which by BNS requires sending finitely many batches.
The condition for starting the timer in line 15 does not strictly use FV as a black box.
However, this use is warranted because line 15 only ‘reads’ the state of the network. ASCP
makes every other change to the network through FV’s primitives.
ASCP guarantees the safety properties of non-blocking Byzantine consensus in §3. Since
a node stops execution after deciding some value, Integrity for intact sets holds trivially.
The requirement in lines 8–12 of Algorithm 2 that a node prepares the candidate ballot
before voting for committing it, enforces that if a voting for committing some ballot within
the nodes of an intact set I succeeds, then some node in I previously prepared that ballot:
◮ Lemma 9. Let S be an FBQS and consider an execution of ASCP over S. Let I be an
intact set in S. If a node v1 ∈ I commits a ballot b, then some node v2 ∈ I prepared b.
Aborting every ballot below and incompatible than the candidate one prevents that one
node in an intact set I prepares a ballot b1, and concurrently another node in I sends
READY(b2, true) with b2 below and incompatible than b1:
◮ Lemma 10. Let S be an FBQS and consider an execution of ASCP over S. Let I
be an intact set in S. Let v1 and v2 be nodes in I and b1 and b2 be ballots such that
b2  b1. The following two things cannot both happen: node v1 prepares b1 and node v2
sends READY(b2, true).
Agreement for intact sets holds as follows: assume towards a contradiction that two nodes
in I respectively commit ballots b1 and b2 with different values. A node in I prepared the
bigger of the two ballots by Lemma 9, which results in a contradiction by Lemma 10.
Lemma 11 below ensures that in line 20 it is safe to take as the new candidate value that
of the largest prepared ballot, which helps to establish Weak validity for intact sets.
◮ Lemma 11. Let S be an FBQS and consider an execution of ASCP over S. Let b1 be the
largest ballot prepared by some node v1 at some moment in the execution. If all nodes are
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honest, then some node v2 proposed b1.x.
Now we examine the liveness properties of non-blocking Byzantine consensus in §3, which
ASCP also meets. Recall from §4 the bounded interval δI that a node in an intact set I
takes to deliver some Boolean for a given ballot, provided that some other node in I has
already delivered a Boolean for the same ballot. Let v be a node in I that prepares some
ballot b such that no other node in I has ever prepared a ballot with round bigger or equal
than b.n. We call the interval of duration δI after v prepares b the window for intact set I
of round b.n. Lemma 12 below guarantees that after some moment in the execution, no two
consecutive windows ever overlap.
◮ Lemma 12. Let S be an FBQS and consider an execution of ASCP over S. Let I be
an intact set in S and assume that all faulty nodes eventually stop. There exists a round n
such that either every node in I decides some value before reaching round n, or otherwise the
windows for I of all the rounds m ≥ n never overlap with each other, and in each window
of round m the nodes in I that have not decided yet only prepare ballots with round m.
Lemma 12 helps to establish Non-blocking for intact sets as follows. After the moment where
no two consecutive windows overlap, either every node in I has the same candidate ballot
at the beginning of the window of some round, or otherwise the highest ballots prepared by
each node in I during that window coincide with each other. In either case all the nodes in
I will eventually have the same candidate ballot, and they will decide a value in bounded
time.
Correctness of ASCP is captured by Theorem 13 below:
◮ Theorem 13. Let S be an FBQS. The ASCP protocol over S satisfies the specification of
non-blocking Byzantine consensus for intact sets.
6 Concrete Stellar Consensus Protocol
In this section we introduce concrete SCP (CSCP) which is amenable to implementation
because each node v maintains finite state and only needs to send and receive a finite number
of messages in order to progress. CSCP relies on bunched voting (BV ) in Algorithm 3, which
generalises FV and embodies all of FV’s instances for each of the ballots. CSCP considers a
single instance of BV, and thus each node v keeps a single process bunched-voting(v) (line 2
of Algorithm 4). In BV, nodes exchange messages that contain two kinds of statements:
a prepare statement prep b encodes the aim to abort the possibly infinite range of ballots
that are lower and incompatible than b; and a commit statement cmt b encodes the aim to
commit ballot b.
Algorithm 3 depicts BV over an FBQS S with set of quorums Q. A node v stores the
highest ballot for which v has respectively voted, readied, or delivered a prepare statement
in fields max-voted-prep, max-readied-prep, and max-delivered-prep (line 2). It also stores the
set of ballots for which v has respectively voted, readied, or delivered a commit statement
in fields ballots-voted-cmt, ballots-readied-cmt, and ballots-delivered-cmt (line 3). All these
fields are finite and thus v maintains only finite state. When a node v invokes prepare(b),
if b exceeds the highest ballot for which v has voted a prepare, then the node updates
max-voted-prep to b and sends VOTE(prep b) to every other node (lines 4–7). The protocol
then proceeds with the usual stages of FV, with the caveat that at each stage of the protocol
only the maximum ballot is considered for which the node can send a message—or deliver an
indication—with a prepare statement. In particular, when there exists a ballot b that exceeds
max-readied-prep and such that v received a message VOTE(prep bu) from each member u
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Algorithm 3: Bunched voting (BV) over an FBQS S with set of quorums Q.
1 process bunched-voting(v ∈ V)
2 max-voted-prep,max-readied-prep,max-delivered-prep ← 〈0,⊥〉 ∈ Ballot;
3 ballots-voted-cmt, ballots-readied-cmt, ballots-delivered-cmt ← ∅ ∈ 2Ballot;
4 prepare(b)
5 if max-voted-prep < b then
6 max-voted-prep ← b;
7 send VOTE(prep max-voted-prep) to every v′ ∈ V;
8 when exists maximum b such that max-voted-prep < b and exists U ∈ Q
such that v ∈ U and for every u ∈ U received VOTE(prep bu) where b′  bu
for every b′  b
9 max-readied-prep ← b ;
10 send READY(prep max-readied-prep) to every v′ ∈ V;
11 when exists maximum b such that max-readied-prep < b and exists
v-blocking B such that for every u ∈ B received READY(prep bu) where
b′  bu for every b′  b
12 max-readied-prep ← b ;
13 send READY(prep max-readied-prep) to every v′ ∈ V;
14 when exists maximum b such that max-delivered-prep < b and exists U ∈ Q
such that v ∈ U and for every u ∈ U received READY(prep bu) where
b′  bu for every b′  b
15 max-delivered-prep ← b;
16 prepared(max-delivered-prep);
17 commit(b)
18 if b 6∈ ballots-voted-cmt and max-voted-prep = b then
19 ballots-voted-cmt ← ballots-voted-cmt ∪ {b};
20 send VOTE(cmt b) to every v′ ∈ V ;
21 when received VOTE(cmt b) from every u ∈ U for some U ∈ Q such that
v ∈ U and b 6∈ ballots-readied-cmt
22 ballots-readied-cmt ← ballots-readied-cmt ∪ {b} ;
23 send READY(cmt b) to every v′ ∈ V ;
24 when received READY(cmt b) from every u ∈ B for some v-blocking B and
b 6∈ ballots-readied-cmt
25 ballots-readied-cmt ← ballots-readied-cmt ∪ {b} ;
26 send READY(cmt b) to every v′ ∈ V ;
27 when received READY(cmt b) from every u ∈ U for some U ∈ Q such that
v ∈ U and b 6∈ ballots-delivered-cmt
28 ballots-delivered-cmt ← ballots-delivered-cmt ∪ {b};
29 committed(b) ;
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of some quorum to which v belongs, then the node proceeds as follows: it checks that each
b′ lower and incompatible than bu is also lower and incompatible than b (line 8). If b is the
maximum ballot passing the previous check for every member u of the quorum, then the
node updates the field max-readied-prep to b and sends the message READY(prep b) to every
other node (lines 9–10). The node v checks similar conditions for the case when it receives
messages READY(prep bu) from each member u of a v-blocking set, and proceeds similarly
by updating max-readied-prep to b and sending READY(prep b) to every other node (lines 11–
13). The node will update max-delivered-prep and trigger the indication prepared(b) when
the same conditions are met after receiving messages READY(prep bu) from each member
u of a quorum to which v belongs (lines 14–16). When a node v invokes commit(b) then
the protocol proceeds with the usual stages of FV with two minor differences (lines 17–29).
First, a node v only votes commit for the highest ballot for which v has voted a prepare
statement (condition max-voted-prep = b in line 18). Second, the protocol uses the sets of
ballots ballots-voted-cmt, ballots-readied-cmt and ballots-delivered-cmt in order to keep track
of the stage of the protocol for each ballot.
The structure of CSCP in Algorithm 4 directly relates to ASCP in Algorithm 2. A node
proposes a value x in line 5. A node tries to prepare a ballot b by invoking prepare(b) in
line 7, and receives the indication prepared(b) in line 8. A node tries to commit a ballot b by
invoking commit(b) in line 12, and receives the indication committed(b) in line 13. A node
decides a value x in line 14. Timeouts are set in lines 15–17 and triggered in line 18.
Next we establish a correspondence between CSCP in and ASCP in §5: the concrete
protocol observationally refines the abstract one, which means that any externally observable
behaviour of the former can also be produced by the latter [6]. Informally, the refinement
shows that for an FBQS S and an intact set I, for every execution of CSCP over S there
exists an execution of ASCP over S (with some behaviour of faulty nodes) such that each
node in I decides the same value in both of the executions. The refinement result allows us
to carry over the correctness of ASCP established in §5 to CSCP.
We first define several notions required to formalise our refinement result. A history is
a sequence of the events v.propose(x) and v.decide(x), where v is a correct node and x a
value. The specification of consensus assumes that v triggers an event v.propose(x), thus a
history will have v.propose(x) for every correct node v. A concrete trace τ is a sequence of
events that subsumes histories, and contains events v.prepare(b), v.commit(b), v.prepared(b),
v.committed(b), v.start-timer(n), v.timeout, v.send(m, v′), and v.receive(m, v′), where v is
a correct node and v′ is any node, b is a ballot, m is a message in {VOTE(s), READY(s)}
with s a statement in {prep b,cmt b}, and n is a round. An abstract trace τ is a se-
quence of events that subsumes histories, and contains events v.start-timer(n), v.timeout,
and batched events v.vote-batch([bi], a), v.deliver-batch([bi], a), v.send-batch([mi], v′), and
v.receive-batch([mi], v′),where v is a correct node and v′ is any node, n is a round, [bi] is a se-
quence of ballots, a is a Boolean, and [mi] is a sequence of messages in {VOTE(b, a), READY(b, a)}.
The sequences of ballots and messages above, which represent a possibly infinite number of
‘batched’ events, ensure that the length of any abstract trace is bounded by ω. We may
omit the adjective ‘concrete/abstract’ from ‘trace’ when it is clear from the context. Given
a trace τ , a history H(τ) can be uniquely obtained from τ by removing every event in τ
different from v.propose(x) or v.decide(x).
An execution of CSCP (respectively, ASCP) entails a concrete trace (respectively, ab-
stract trace) τ iff for every invocation and indication as well as for every send or receive
primitive in an execution of the protocol in Algorithm 4 (respectively, for every invocation,
indication and primitive in an execution of the protocol in Algorithm 2, where the vote,
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Algorithm 4: Concrete SCP (CSCP) over an FBQS S with set of quorums Q.
1 process concrete-consensus(v ∈ V)
2 brs ← new process bunched-voting(v);
3 candidate, prepared ← 〈0,⊥〉 ∈ Ballot;
4 round ← 0 ∈ N+ ∪ {0};
5 propose(x)
6 candidate ← 〈1, x〉;
7 brs.prepare(candidate);
8 when triggered brs.prepared(b) and prepared < b
9 prepared ← b;
10 if candidate ≤ prepared then
11 candidate ← prepared;
12 brs.commit(candidate);
13 when triggered brs.committed(b)
14 trigger decide(b.x);
15 when exists U ∈ Q such that v ∈ U and for each u ∈ U exist
Mu ∈ {VOTE, READY} and bu ∈ Ballot such that round < bu.n and received
Mu(su bu) from u with su ∈ {cmt, prep}
16 round ← min{bu.n | u ∈ U};
17 start-timer(F (round));
18 when triggered timeout
19 if prepared = 〈0,⊥〉 then candidate ← 〈round + 1, candidate.x〉;
20 else candidate ← 〈round + 1, prepared.x〉;
21 brs.prepare(candidate);
deliver, send and receive events are batched together), τ contains corresponding events in the
same order.
We are interested in traces that are relative to some intact set I. Given a trace τ , the
I-projected trace τ |I is obtained by removing the events v.ev ∈ τ such that v 6∈ I.
◮ Theorem 14. Let S be an FBQS and I be an intact set. For every execution of CSCP over
S with trace τ , there exists an execution of ASCP over S with trace ρ and H(τ |I) = H(ρ|I).
Proof sketch. We define a simulation function σ from concrete to abstract traces. The-
orem 14 can be established by showing that, for every finite prefix τ of a trace entailed by
CSCP, the simulation σ(τ) is a prefix of a trace entailed by ASCP. ◭
Every execution of ASCP enjoys the properties of Integrity, Agreement for intact sets,
Weak validity for intact sets and Non-blocking for intact sets, and so does every execution
of CSCP by refinement.
◮ Corollary 15. Let S be an FBQS. The CSCP protocol over S satisfies the specification of
non-blocking Byzantine consensus for intact sets.
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7 Lying about Quorum Slices
So far we have assumed the unrealistic setting where faulty nodes do not equivocate their
quorum slices, so all nodes share the same FBQS S. We now lift this assumption. To this
end, we use a generalisation of FBQS called subjective FBQS [7], which allows faulty nodes
to lie about their quorum slices. Assuming thatVok is the set of correct nodes, the subjective
FBQS {Sv}v∈Vok is an indexed family of FBQSes where the different FBQSes agree on the
quorum slices of correct nodes, i.e., ∀v1, v2, v ∈ Vok. Sv1(v) = Sv2(v). For each correct
node v, the FBQS Sv is the view of node v, which reflects the choices of trust communicated
to v. We can run either ASCP or CSCP over a subjective FBQS {Sv}v∈Vok by letting each
correct node v act according to its view Sv.
We generalise the definition of intact set to subjective FBQSes, and we lift our results
so far to the subjective FBQSes. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS. A set I is an intact
set iff for each v ∈ Vok the set I is a quorum in Sv that only contains correct nodes, and
every member of I is intertwined with each other in the projected FBQS Sv|I .
◮ Lemma 16. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS. For any node v ∈ Vok, a set I is an
intact set in Sv iff I is an intact set in {Sv}v∈Vok .
Since Lemma 16 above guarantees that every view has the same intact sets, which also
coincide with the intact sets of the subjective FBQS, from now on we may say ‘an intact
set I’ and omit to which system (a particular view, or the subjective FBQS) I belongs .
Using the fact that nodes agree on the slices of correct nodes, we can prove Lemma 17
below, which is the analogue to Lemma 3 and states sufficient safety conditions for the nodes
in an intact set I to reach agreement when each node acts according to its own view.
◮ Lemma 17. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS and for each correct node v let Qv be
the set of quorums in the view Sv. Let I be an intact set and consider two quorums U1 and
U2 in
⋃
v∈Vok
Qv. If U1 ∩ I 6= ∅ and U2 ∩ I 6= ∅, then U1 ∩ U2 ∩ I 6= ∅.
Using arguments similar to those in the previous sections, we can establish the correctness
of ASCP and CSCP over subjective FBQSes.
◮ Theorem 18. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS. The ASCP protocol over {Sv}v∈Vok
satisfies the specification of non-blocking Byzantine consensus for intact sets.
◮ Theorem 19. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS and I be an intact set. For every
execution of CSCP over {Sv}v∈Vok with trace τ , there exists an execution of ASCP over
{Sv}v∈Vok with trace ρ and H(τ |I) = H(ρ|I).
◮ Corollary 20. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS. The CSCP protocol over {Sv}v∈Vok
satisfies the specification of non-blocking Byzantine consensus for intact sets.
8 Related Work
García-Pérez and Gotsman [7] have previously investigated Stellar’s federated voting and its
relationship to Bracha’s broadcast over classical Byzantine quorum systems. They did not
address the full Stellar consensus protocol. Our proof of SCP establishes the correctness of
federated voting by adjusting the results in [7] to multiple intact sets within the system.
Losa et al. [10] have also investigated consensus over FBQSs. They propose a gener-
alisation of Stellar’s quorums that does not prescribe constructing them from slices, yet
allows different participants to disagree on what constitutes a quorum. They then propose a
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protocol solving consensus over intact sets in this setting that provides better liveness guar-
antees than SCP, but is impractical. Losa et al.’s work is orthogonal to ours: they consider
a more general setting than Stellar’s and a theoretical protocol, whereas we investigate the
practical protocol used by Stellar.
The advent of blockchain has given rise to a number of novel proposals of BFT protocols;
see [3] for a survey. Out of these, the most similar one to Stellar is Ripple [15]. In particular,
Ripple have recently proposed a protocol called Cobalt that allows for a federated setting
similar to Stellar’s [11]. We hope that our work will pave the way to investigating the
correctness of this and similar protocols.
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A Proofs in §2
◮ Lemma 21 (Lemma 33 in [8]). Let U be a quorum in an FBQS S, let I be a set of nodes,
and let U ′ = U ∩ I. If U ′ 6= ∅ then U ′ is a quorum in S|I .
Proof. Straightforward by the definition of the projection operation. ◭
◮ Lemma 22. Let S be an FBQS and assume some set of faulty nodes. Let I be an intact
set in S. Every two quorums in S|I have non-empty intersection.
Proof. Straightforward, since every node in S|I is intertwined with each other by definition
of intact set. ◭
Proof of Lemma 3. U1 ∩ I and U2 ∩ I are quorums in S|I by Lemma 21. Since every two
quorums in S|I have non-empty intersection by Lemma 22, we have (U1 ∩ I) ∩ (U2 ∩ I) =
(U1 ∩ U2) ∩ I 6= ∅. Therefore the intersection U1 ∩ U2 contains some node in I. ◭
Proof of Lemma 4. Assume Vok is the set of correct nodes, and let I1 and I2 be intact sets
such that I1 ∩ I2 6= ∅. Assume towards a contradiction that I1 ∪ I2 is not an intact set, and
therefore there exist nodes v1 ∈ I1 and v2 ∈ I2 that are not intertwined. By definition of
intertwined, this assumption entails that there exist quorums U1 and U2 such that v1 ∈ U1
and v2 ∈ U2, and (U1 ∩ U2) ∩Vok = ∅. Since both U1 and I2 are quorums in S and both
have non-empty intersection with the intact set I1, we have (U1 ∩ I2) ∩ I1 6= ∅ by Lemma 3,
and we can conclude that U1 has non-empty intersection with the intact set I2. Thus, we
know that (U1 ∩U2)∩ I2 6= ∅ again by Lemma 3. But this results in a contradiction because
(U1 ∩ U2) ∩ I2 = ∅ by assumptions, since I2 contains only correct nodes. ◭
B Proofs in §4
Proof of Lemma 5. Since I is a quorum in S and by the definition of quorum, for every
node v ∈ I there exists one slice of v that lies within I, and the required holds. ◭
◮ Lemma 23 (Analogous to Lemma 36 in [8] for intact sets). Let S be an FBQS and t be a
tag, and consider an execution of the instance for t of FV over S. Let I be an intact set in
S. The first node v ∈ I that sends a READY(t, a) message first needs to receive a VOTE(t, a)
message from every member of a quorum U to which v belongs.
Proof. Let v be any node in I. By Lemma 5 no v-blocking set B exists such that B ∩ I = ∅.
Therefore, the first node v ∈ I that sends a READY(t, a) message does it through lines 7–9
of Algorithm 1, which means that v received VOTE(t, a) messages from every member of a
quorum U to which v belongs. ◭
◮ Lemma 24. Let S be an FBQS and assume some set of faulty nodes. Let I be an intact
set in S, and consider a set B of nodes. If B is not v-blocking for any v ∈ I \B, then either
B ⊇ I or I \B is a quorum in S|I .
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Proof. Assume B is not v-blocking for any v ∈ I \B. If B ⊇ I then we are done. Otherwise,
for every node v in I \ B, there exists a slice q ∈ S(v) such that q ∩ B = ∅. We know that
q ∩ I 6= ∅ since v ∈ q by definition of FBQS. We also know that q ∩ I ∈ S|I(v) by definition
of S|I , and since q ∩B = ∅, the intersection q ∩ I is a subset of I \ B. Since for each node
v ∈ I there exists a slice q ∈ S(v) such that q ∩ I is a subset of I \ B, the set I \ B is a
quorum in S|I , as required. ◭
◮ Lemma 25 (Analogous to Lemma 16 in [8] for intact sets). Let S be an FBQS and t be a
tag, and consider an execution of the instance for t of FV over S. Let I be an intact set in
S. If two nodes in I send respectively messages READY(t, a) and READY(t, a′), then a = a′.
Proof. Assume that two nodes in I send respectively messages READY(t, a) and READY(t, a′).
By Lemma 23, some node v ∈ I has received VOTE(t, a) from a quorum U to which v belongs,
and some node v′ ∈ I has received VOTE(t, a′) from a quorum U ′ to which v′ belongs. By
Lemma 3, the intersection U ∩ U ′ contains some node in I, so that this node has sent
VOTE(t, a) and VOTE(t, a′). But due to the use of the guard variable voted in lines 2 and 4–5
of Algorithm 1, a node can only vote for one value per tag, and thus it cannot vote different
values for the same tag. Hence, a = a′. ◭
◮ Lemma 26 (Analogous to Lemma 17 in [8] for intact sets). Let S be an FBQS and assume
some set of faulty nodes. Let I be an intact set in S. Assume that I = V + ⊎ V − and for
some quorum U we have U ∩I ⊆ V +. Then either V − = ∅ or there exists some node v ∈ V −
such that V + is v-blocking.
Proof. Assume that V + is not v-blocking for any v ∈ V −. By Lemma 24, either V − = ∅
or V − is a quorum in S|I . In the former case we are done, while in the latter we get a
contradiction as follows. By Lemma 21, the intersection U∩I is a quorum in S|I . Since every
two quorums in S|I have non-empty intersection by Lemma 22, we have (U ∩ I) ∩ V − 6= ∅.
But this is impossible, since U ∩ I ⊆ V + and V + ∩ V − = ∅. ◭
Proof of Theorem 6. We prove that the instance for tag t of FV over S enjoys each of the
properties that define the specification of reliable Byzantine voting for intact sets.
No duplication: Straightforward by the use of the guard variable delivered in line 28 of
Algorithm 1.
Totality for intact sets: Assume some node in I delivers a value a for tag t. By the condition
in line 7 of Algorithm 1, the node has received READY(t, a) messages from every member
in a quorum U . Since U ∩ I contains only correct nodes, these nodes send READY(t, a)
messages to every node. By the condition in line 10 of Algorithm 1, any correct node v
sends READY(t, a) messages if it receives READY(t, a) from every member in a v-blocking
set. Hence, the READY(t, a) messages from the nodes in U ∩ I may convince additional
correct nodes to send READY(t, a) messages to every node. Let these additional correct
nodes send READY(t, a) messages until a point is reached at which no further nodes in I
can send READY(t, a) messages. At this point, let V + be the set of nodes in I that sent
READY(t, a) messages (where U ∩I ⊆ V +), and let V − = I \V +. By Lemma 25 the nodes
in V − did not send any READY(t,_) messages at all. The set V + cannot be v-blocking
for any node v in V −, or else more nodes in I could come to send READY(t, a) messages.
Then by Lemma 26 we have V − = ∅, meaning that every node in I has sent READY(t, a)
messages. Since I is a quorum, all the nodes in I will eventually deliver a Boolean for
tag t due to the condition in line 7 of Algorithm 1.
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Consistency for intertwined nodes: Assume that two intertwined nodes v and v′ deliver
values a and a′ for tag t respectively. By the condition in line 13, the nodes received
a quorum of READY(t, a), respectively, READY(t, a′) messages. Since the two nodes are
intertwined, there is a correct node u in the intersection of the two quorums, which sent
both READY(t, a) and READY(t, a′). By the use of the guard variable readied in line 7 of
Algorithm 1, node u can only send one and the same ready message for tag t to every
other node, and thus a = a′ as required.
Validity for intact sets: Assume every node in an intact set I votes for value a. Since I is
a quorum, every node in I will eventually send READY(t, a) by the condition in line 7 of
Algorithm 1. By Lemma 25, these messages cannot carry a value different from a. Then
by the condition in line 13 of Algorithm 1 every node in I will eventually deliver the
value a for tag t. Due to Consistency for intact sets, no node delivers a value different
from a. ◭
Proof ol Lemma 7. We show how to strengthen the proof of Totality for intact sets above
to prove the required. In order to reach the point at which no further nodes in I can send
READY(b, a) messages, each node has to send and receive a finite number of messages. This
number is unknown, but its upper bound is determined by the size of the system and the
topology of the slices, and thus it is constant and bounded. Since GST has expired, the
point at which no further nodes in I can send READY(b, a) messages is reached in bounded
time. Therefore, every node in I sends READY(b, a) to every other node in I in bounded time.
These messages arrive in bounded time too, after which every node in I delivers a value,
and the required holds. ◭
C Proofs in §5
In the remainder of the appendix, we say ballot b1 is below and compatible than ballot b2
(written b1 . b2) iff b1 ≤ b2 and b1 ∼ b2.
Proof of Lemma 9. Assume that a node v1 ∈ I commits ballot b. By line 7 of Algorithm 1,
node v1 received READY(b, true) from every member of a quorum to which v1 belongs. By
Lemma 23 the first node to do so received VOTE(b, true) messages from every member of a
quorum U to which v1 belongs. Since v1 is intertwined with every other node in I, there
exists a correct node v2 in the intersection U ∩ I that sent VOTE(b, true). The node v2
can send VOTE(b, true) only through line 6 of Algorithm 1, which means that v2 triggers
brs[b].vote(true) in line 12 of Algorithm 2. By line 8 of the same figure, this is only possible
after v2 has aborted every b′  b, and the lemma holds. ◭
Proof of Lemma 10. Assume towards a contradiction that v1 prepares b1, and that v2 sends
READY(b2, true). By definition of prepare, node v1 aborted every ballot b  b1. By line 7 of
Algorithm 1, node v1 received READY(b, false) from every member of a quorum Ub for each
ballot b  b1. By assumptions, b2  b1, and therefore v2 received READY(b2, false) from every
member of the quorum Ub2 . By Lemma 23, the first node u1 ∈ I that sent READY(b2, false)
received VOTE(b2, false) from a quorum U1 to which u1 belongs. Since v2 sent READY(b2, true)
and by Lemma 23, the first node u2 ∈ I that sent READY(b2, true) received VOTE(b2, true) from
a quorum U2 to which u2 belongs. Since u1 and u2 are intertwined, the intersection U1 ∩U2
contains some correct node v, which sent both VOTE(b2, false) and VOTE(b2, true) messages.
By the use of the Boolean voted in line 3 of Algorithm 1 this results in a contradiction and
we are done. ◭
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◮ Lemma 27. Let S be an FBQS and consider an execution of ASCP over S. Let I be an
intact set in S. If a node v1 ∈ I commits a ballot b1, then the largest ballot b2 prepared by
any node v2 ∈ I before v1 commits b1 is such that b1 ∼ b2.
Proof. Assume node v1 commits ballot b1. By the guard in line 13 of Algorithm 1, node v1
received the message READY(b1, true) from every member of a quorum to which v1 belongs,
which entails that node v1 received READY(b1, true) from itself. By Lemma 23, the first
node u ∈ I that send READY(b1, true) needs to receive a VOTE(b1, true) message from every
member of some quorum to which u belongs. Thus, u itself triggered brs[b1].vote(true), which
by lines 7 and 21 of Algorithm 2 means that u prepared ballot b1. Hence, the largest ballot
b2 such that there exists a node v2 ∈ I that triggers brs[b2].vote(true) before v1 commits b1,
is bigger or equal than b1. If b2 = b1, then b2.x = b1.x and by lines 8–12 of Algorithm 2,
node v2 prepares b2 before it triggers brs[b2].vote(true) and the lemma holds.
If b2 > b1, then we assume towards a contradiction that b2.x 6= b1.x. By lines 8–12 of
Algorithm 2, node v2 prepared b2. But this results in a contradiction by Lemma 10, because
v1 and v2 are intertwined and v1 sent READY(b1, true), but b1  b2. Therefore b2.x = b1.x,
and by lines 8–12 of Algorithm 2, node v2 prepares b2 before it triggers brs[b2].vote(true). ◭
We define the ready-tree for Boolean a and ballot b at node v, which characterises the
messages that need to be exchanged by the FV protocol in order for node v to send a
READY(b, a) message, under the assumption that all nodes are honest. The ready-tree for
Boolean a and ballot b at node v is the tree computed recursively as follows:
If v sent the message after receiving VOTE(b, a) from every member of a quorum U , then
let U be the root of the tree, which has no children.
If v sent the message after receiving READY(b, a) from every member of a v-blocking set
B, then let B be the root of the tree, and let its children be the ready-trees for Boolean
a and ballot b at each of the members of B.
For short, we may say ‘ready-tree at node v’ when the Boolean a and the ballot b are clear
from the context.
A ready-tree is always of finite height, or otherwise some node would have faked ready
messages by lines 7–9 and 10–12 of Algorithm 1, which contradicts the assumption that all
nodes are honest.
◮ Lemma 28. Let S be an FBQS and b be a ballot, and consider and execution of the instance
for ballot b of FV over S. Assume all nodes are honest. If a node v sends READY(b, a) then
there exists a quorum U such that every member of U sent VOTE(b, a).
Proof. Assume that a node v sends READY(b, a), and consider the ready-tree at node v. The
lemma holds since each leaf of the ready-tree is a quorum whose members sent VOTE(b, a). ◭
Proof of Lemma 11. Assume all nodes are honest, which entails that each node in the
system sends the same set of batches to every node. We proceed by induction on the
number of batches sent by the nodes in the execution so far.
Since v1 prepares b1, and by lines 13–15 of Algorithm 1, for each ballot bi  b1 there exists
a quorum Ui such that v1 receives READY(bi, false) from every member of Ui. Since the num-
ber of quorums to which v1 belongs is finite and by BNS, there exists a quorum UR among
the Ui such that every member of UR sent a batch containing a message READY(bj , false) for
each bj in some right-open interval [b, b1) with b < b1, where the ballot b is determined by
the ballots that v1 had aborted before preparing b1. If v1 had aborted every ballot bk . b1
before preparing b1, or if v1 had received from each member of UR a message READY(bk, false)
for each ballot bk . b1 such that v1 did not abort bk before preparing b1, then v1 would
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have prepared a ballot bigger than b1 by BNS and by lines 13–15 of Algorithm 1, which
contradicts the assumptions. Therefore, there exists a ballot b0 . b1 and a node u ∈ UR
such that v1 did not abort b0 before preparing b1, and such that v1 received from u a batch
that contains a message READY(bj , false) for each bj ∈ [b, b1), but which does not contain the
message READY(b0, false).
By Lemma 28, for each bj ∈ [b, b1) there exists a quorum Uj such that u received
VOTE(bj , false) from each member of Uj . Without loss of generality, we fix each Uj to be
the union of the quorums at the leaves of the ready-tree for Boolean false and ballot bj at
node u, which is itself a quorum since quorums are closed by union. What follows mimics
the argument used in the previous paragraph in order to show that some node exists that
sent enough vote messages to prepare b1, and not so many as to prepare a ballot bigger than
b1. Since the number of quorums to which u belongs is finite and by BNS, there exists a
quorum UV among the Uj such that every member of UV sent a batch containing a message
VOTE(bℓ, false) for each bℓ in some right-open interval [b′, b1) with b′ < b1, where the ballot
b′ is determined by the messages sent by u before sending the batch that contains the ready
messages described in the paragraph above. If u had sent READY(bk, false) for every ballot
bk . b1 before sending the batch described in the paragraph above, or if u had received
from each member of UV a message VOTE(bk, false) for each ballot bk . b1 such that u did
not send READY(bk, false) before sending the batch described in the paragraph above, then
the ballot b0 would not exist by the definition of ready-tree, by BNS, and by lines 13–15 of
Algorithm 1, which would contradict the facts established in the paragraph below. Therefore,
there exists a ballot b′0 . b1 and a node v2 ∈ UV such that u did not send READY(b
′
0, false)
before sending the batch described in the paragraph above, and such that u received from
v2 a batch that contains a message VOTE(bℓ, false) for each bℓ ∈ [b′, b1), but which does not
contain the message VOTE(b′0, false).
By BNS and by line 4 of Algorithm 1 and lines 7 and 21 of Algorithm 2, in order for
v2 to send a batch containing the vote messages described in the previous paragraph, the
node necessarily tried to prepare some ballot b2 ≥ b1 such that b2.x 6∈ {b.x | b ∈ [b′, b1)}—
which results in v2 triggering brs[bi].vote(bi, false) for each ballot bi  b2, thus triggering
brs[bℓ].vote(bℓ, false) for each ballot bℓ ∈ [b′, b1)—and either
(i) b1 . b2, or otherwise
(ii) b1  b2 and v2 triggered brs[b′0].vote(b
′
0, true) before triggering the brs[bi].vote(bi, false)
for each bi  b2,
which prevents that v2 triggers brs[b′0].vote(b
′
0, false).
We show that (i) above always holds. Assume (ii) towards a contradiction. Let us
focus on the ballots b3 = 〈1, b1.x〉 . b1 and b4 = 〈1, b2.x〉 . b2. By BNS node v2 triggered
each brs[bj ].vote(bj , true) before triggering any brs[bi].vote(bi, false) with i ≥ j, and thus it
triggered brs[b3].vote(b3, true) before triggering the brs[bi].vote(bi, false) with bi ≥ b3 and bi 
b4. Since v2 triggers brs[b3].vote(b3, true), and by lines 8–12 of Algorithm 2, the largest ballot
candidate prepared by v2 before triggering brs[b3].vote(b3, false) is such that candidate ≤ b3.
Since every node proposes some value when the execution of the protocol starts by the
specification of consensus, the value candidate.x is bigger or equal than the value proposed
by v2 by lines 6, 10 and 11 of Algorithm 2. Since v2 triggered brs[bi].vote(bi, false) for each
bi  b4, and by BNS and by line 7 of Algorithm 2, node v2 proposed a value bigger or equal
than b4.x. But since candidate ≤ b3 < b4, this contradicts the fact we established earlier
that candidate.x is bigger or equal than the value proposed by v2. Therefore, we know that
b2 & b1.
Now we distinguish the following cases. If b2.n = 1 then, by line 7 of Algorithm 2, node
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v2 proposed b2.x = b1.x and the lemma holds. If b2.n > 1 then, by BNS and by lines 18–21
of Algorithm 2, node v2 triggered a timeout event when its current round was b2.n − 1. If
v2 never prepared any ballot when this timeout expired, then by line 19 of Algorithm 2 the
node proposed b2.x and the lemma holds. Otherwise, by line 20 of Algorithm 2 the value
b2.x is equal to h.x where h is the largest ballot prepared by v2 when that timeout expired,
and the required holds by applying the induction hypothesis. ◭
Recall from §4 the window for intact set I of round n, which is the interval of duration
δI in which every node in I that has not decided any value yet prepares a ballot of round n.
Now we introduce some additionally terminology for the proofs in the remainder of the
appendix. Assume all faulty nodes have stopped, and consider the window for intact set I
of round n, where we let vn be the first node in I that prepares a ballot bn with round n.
By line 8 of Algorithm 2 and lines 13–15 of Algorithm 1, for each ballot bi  bn there exists
a quorum Ui such that node vn received READY(bi, false) from each member of Ui. We call
the prepare-footprint for intact set I of round n, written PnI , to the set computed as follows:
Let vn ∈ I be the first node in I that prepares a ballot bn with round n.
Let h be the highest ballot prepared by vn before preparing bn.
Compute the set of ballots that vn needs to abort in order to prepare bn and that vn did
not abort previously. This is, take the ballots bj  bn such that either bj > h, or bj . h
and vn never aborted bj yet.
For each bj in the set computed in the previous step, and for each member u ∈ Uj,
compute the ready-tree of Boolean false and ballot bj at node u.
Let PnI be the union of the leaves of all the ready-trees computed in the previous step.
Since the leaves of any ready-tree are quorums, and since quorums are closed under union,
the prepare-footprint PnI is a quorum. By the definition of ready-tree, node vn prepares bn
because of the vote messages sent by each member of PnI .
For each window for intact set I and round n, we consider the abort-interval for intact
set I of round n, which is the interval in which the nodes in PnI send the vote messages
needed for vn to prepare bn. We write δAnI for the duration of the abort-interval for intact
set I of round n.
Since the prepare-footprint PnI of any round n in any execution of ASCP is finite, and
since messages arrive in bounded time after GST expires, after the last node in the prepare
footprint PnI sends its messages, the first node vn ∈ I that prepares a ballot bn with round
n does so in bounded time. We write δPnI for the finite delay that vn takes in preparing bn
after every node in PnI has sent their messages, once GST has expired. Since the number
of nodes in the universe is finite, all the δPnI with any round n are bounded by some finite
delay δPI .
From now on we may omit the ‘for intact set I’ qualifier from the window, the abort-
interval and the prepare-footprint of round n when the intact set is clear from the context.
Proof of Lemma 12. If every node in I decides a value before reaching some round n then
we are done. Otherwise, assume that GST has expired and let δ be the network delay
after GST. Without loss of generality, assume that all faulty nodes have already stopped.
Let n0 be a round such that the abort-interval of round n0 happens entirely after GST.
(We accompany the proof with Figure 2 to illustrate the intervals that we describe in the
remainder.) After the abort-interval of n0, the first node vn0 ∈ I to ever prepare a ballot bn0
with round n0 does it less than δPI time after the abort-interval of n0 terminates. By Totality
for intact nodes, each node in I that has not decided any value yet prepares some ballot
with round n0 during the window of round n0, and thus by lines lines 15–17 of Algorithm 2
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Figure 2 Window (boxed) and abort-interval of round n, assuming that F (n) > δAnI + δ
P
I + δI .
each node in I that has not decided any value yet sets its timeout to F (n0) in the period
of time between the beginning of the abort-interval of n0 and the end of the window of n0.
(Remember the primitive start-timer has the effect of restarting the timeout if a node’s local
timer was already running.) This period of time has a duration bounded by δAn0I + δ
P
I + δI .
Now consider any round n ≥ n0 and assume that F (n) > δAnI + δ
P
I + δI . As shown in
Figure 2, the abort-interval of round n + 1 happens entirely after the window of round n
ends. Since the window of round n+1 can only happen once the nodes in the abort-interval
of round n + 1 have sent their messages, the window of round n + 1 does not overlap the
window of round n. And since the delay function F doubles its value with each increment
of the round, the same happens with any subsequent window thereafter. By the definition
of window of round n, no node in I ever prepares a ballot with round equal or bigger than n
before the window starts. Since faulty nodes are stopped, and by lines 18–21 of Algorithm 2,
no messages supporting to prepare a ballot of round n + 1 are ever sent before the abort-
interval of round n+ 1 starts. Therefore, each window of round n+ 1 with n ≥ n0 happens
after the immediately preceding window of round n, and no two of such windows overlap
with each other, and the lemma holds. ◭
◮ Corollary 29. Let m ≥ n and let bmax be the maximum ballot prepared by any node in
I before the abort-interval of round m+ 1 starts. Every node in I prepares bmax before the
abort-interval of round m+ 1 starts.
Proof. Since the set-timeout interval is of length at most δ, ballot bmax is prepared by some
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node in I within δ+ δPI time after the set-timeout interval of round m starts. By Lemma 7,
every node in I prepares bmax within δ+ δPI + δI time after the set-timeout interval of round
m starts. The required holds since F (m) > δ + δPI + δI . ◭
Proof of Theorem 13. We prove that ASCP over S enjoys each of the properties that define
the specification of non-blocking Byzantine consensus for intact sets.
Integrity: Straightforward by definition since each node v stops execution once v decides
some value.
Agreement for intact sets: Assume towards a contradiction that two nodes v1 and v2 in
I decide respectively through ballots b1 and b2 such that b1.x 6= b2.x. Without loss of
generality, we assume b1 < b2. By line 13 of Algorithm 2, nodes v1 and v2 respectively
committed ballots b1 and b2. Since v1 has committed ballot b1 and by lines 13–15 of
Algorithm 1, node v1 received READY(b1, true) from a quorum to which v1 belongs. And
since v2 has committed ballot b2 and by Lemma 9, we know that some correct node
v′ ∈ I has prepared b2. But this results in a contradiction by Lemma 10 and we are
done.
Weak validity for intact sets: Assume all nodes are honest. To prove the first part of the
property, let every node propose value x. Now assume towards a contradiction that a
node v1 ∈ I decides value y 6= x. By Lemma 27, the largest ballot b2 prepared by any
node v2 ∈ I before v1 decides y is such that b2.x = y. By Lemma 11, there exists a node
that proposed value y. But this contradicts our assumption that every node proposed
value x.
To prove the second part of the property, let a node v1 ∈ I decide value x. By Lemma 27,
the largest ballot b prepared by any node v2 ∈ I before v1 decides x is such that b.x = x.
By Lemma 11, there exists a node that proposed value x, and we are done.
Non-blocking for intact sets: Assume all faulty nodes eventually stop. If some node in I
decides some value, then by Lemma 7 and by Agreement for intact sets every other node
in I will decide the same value within bounded time. Without loss of generality, assume
that no node in I has decided any value and that GST has expires and every malicious
node has stopped. By Lemma 9, no node can ever send a READY(b, true) message for a
ballot b below and incompatible than any ballot that is already prepared, and thus no
node can block itself by signalling that its willingness to commit a ballot that can no
longer be committed. By Lemma 12 there exists a round n such that any two windows
of rounds bigger or equal than n never overlap. Without loss of generality, assume that
no node in i has decided any valued before the window of round n. By Corollary 29, for
every window of round m bigger or equal than n, every node in I that has not decided
any value yet prepares the same ballot bmax before the abort-interval of round m + 1
starts. If every node in I updates its candidate ballot to bmax before the abort-interval
of round m + 1 starts, then every node in I will try to commit bmax by lines 8–12 of
Algorithm 2, and they all will decide value bmax.x in bounded time by lines 3–6, 7–9
and 13–15 of Algorithm 1, and lines 13–14 of Algorithm 2. Otherwise, every node in I
will update its candidate ballot to 〈m+ 1, bmax.x〉 in the abort-interval of round m+ 1,
and all will try to commit 〈m + 1, bmax.x〉 and decide value bmax.x in bounded time for
reasons similar to the ones above. ◭
Now we introduce a notation for sequence comprehension that we will use intensively in
the remainder of the appendices. We write [el1, . . . , elm] for a sequence of elements, where
each element eli is a ballot, an event or a message. We write [ ] for the empty sequence and
τ1 · τ2 for the concatenation of sequences. The notation [el(b), P (b)] stands for the sequence
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[el(b1), . . . , el(bm)] where each element el(bi) depends on a ballot bi that meets predicate P ,
and where the elements are ordered in ascending ballot order, this is, el(bi) occurs before
el(bj) in [el(b), P (b)] iff i < j.
2
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R
E
F
E
R
E
N
C
E
S
Node v1 Node v2 Node v3 Node v4
propose(3)
vote-batch([b, b  〈1,3〉], false)
[VOTE(b, false), b  〈1,3〉]
propose(3)
vote-batch([b, b  〈1,3〉], false)
[VOTE(b, false), b  〈1,3〉]
[VOTE(b, false), b  〈1, 2〉] propose(1)
vote-batch([b, b  〈1, 1〉], false)
[VOTE(〈0,⊥〉, false)]
start-timer(F (1))
[READY(b, false), b  〈1,2〉]
start-timer(F (1))
[READY(b, false), b  〈1,2〉]
start-timer(F (1))
[READY(〈0,⊥〉, false)]
deliver-batch([b, b  〈1, 1〉], false) deliver-batch([b, b  〈1, 1〉], false) deliver-batch([b, b  〈1,1〉], false)
vote-batch([〈1, 1〉], true)
[VOTE(〈1, 1〉, true)]
[READY(〈1,1〉, false)]
deliver-batch([〈1, 1〉], false) deliver-batch([〈1, 1〉], false) deliver-batch([〈1, 1〉], false)
vote-batch([〈1, 2〉], true)
[VOTE(〈1, 2〉, true)]
...
...
...
...
timeout
vote-batch([b  〈2,2〉], false)
[VOTE(b, false), 〈1,3〉 ≤ b  〈2,2〉]
timeout
vote-batch([b  〈2,2〉], false)
[VOTE(b, false), 〈1,3〉 ≤ b  〈2, 2〉]
timeout
vote-batch([b  〈2, 2〉], false)
[VOTE(b, false), 〈1, 3〉 ≤ b  〈2,2〉]
start-timer(F (2))
[READY(b, false), 〈1, 3〉 ≤ b  〈2,2〉]
start-timer(F (2))
[READY(b, false), 〈1, 3〉 ≤ b  〈2,2〉]
start-timer(F (2))
[READY(b, false), 〈1,3〉 ≤ b  〈2,2〉]
deliver-batch([b, 〈1,3〉 ≤ b  〈2, 2〉], false)
[VOTE(〈2,2〉, true)]
deliver-batch([b, 〈1,3〉 ≤ b  〈2,2〉], false)
[VOTE(〈2,2〉, true)]
deliver-batch([b, 〈1,3〉 ≤ b  〈2,2〉], false)
[VOTE(〈2, 2〉, true)]
[READY(〈2, 2〉, true)] [READY(〈2,2〉, true)] [READY(〈2,2〉, true)]
deliver-batch([〈2, 2〉], true)
decide(2)
deliver-batch([〈2, 2〉], true)
decide(2)
deliver-batch([〈2, 2〉], true)
decide(2)
Figure 3 Execution of ASCP.
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◮ Example 30. Consider the FBQS from Example 8 where the universe contains four nodes
v1 to v4 and every set of three or more nodes is a quorum, and every set of two or more
nodes is v-blocking for any v ∈ V. Consider an execution of ASCP where the node v3 is
faulty. The FBQS has the intact set I = {v1, v2, v4}.
We assume that the set of values coincides with N+, which we write in boldface. In
the execution, nodes v1 and v2 propose value 3, and node v4 propose value 1. Faulty node
v3 sends a batch containing the messages VOTE(〈0,⊥〉, false) and VOTE(〈1,1〉, false) to every
correct node, thus helping them to prepare ballot 〈1,2〉. Since 〈1,2〉 exceeds v4’s candidate
ballot 〈1,1〉, node v4 will try to commit both 〈1,1〉 and 〈1,2〉. However, neither of v1 or
v2 will try to commit any ballot since 〈1,2〉 is smaller than their candidate ballot 〈1,3〉,
and therefore no quorum exists that tries to commit a ballot. Consequently, the timeout at
round 1 of every correct node will expire, and since all of them managed to prepare 〈1,2〉,
they all will try to prepare the increased ballot 〈2,2〉, and will ultimately commit that
ballot and decide value 2. Notice that value 2 was not proposed by any correct node, but
nevertheless all of them agree on the same decision. To the nodes in I, node v3 being faulty
is indistinguishable from the situation where node v3 is correct but slow, and it proposes
2. Therefore the nodes in I cannot detect whether the decided value was proposed by some
node in I or not.
Figure 3 depicts the trace of the execution of ASCP described above. In each cell, we
separate by a dashed line the events (above the line) that are triggered atomically, if any,
from the batches of messages (below the line) that are sent by the node, if any. By BNS,
the sending of every batch happens atomically with the events above the dashed line. At
each cell, a node has received every batch in the rows above it. (For convenience, above the
dashed line, we depict ‘batched’ events vote-batch and deliver-batch, which are defined in §6.
Under the dashed line, we save the ‘batched’ send and receive primitives, and we depict one
batch of messages per line.)
In the first row of Figure 3, the correct nodes v1, v2 and v4 try to prepare the ballots that
they propose (lines 5–7 of Algorithm 2 and lines 3–6 of Algorithm 1), which results in each of
the v1, v2 and v4 sending a VOTE(b, false) message for each b  〈1, x〉, where x is respectively
3, 3 and 1. (Faulty node v3 sends a VOTE(b, false) message for each b  〈1,2〉.) Notice the
use of the sequence comprehension notation to denote sequences of events triggered in a cell,
as well as sequences of messages in a batch. To wit, node v1 triggers propose(3) followed by
the batched event vote-batch([b, b  〈1,3〉], false), which stands for
[ballots[〈0,⊥〉].vote(〈0,⊥〉, false), ballots[〈1,1〉].vote(〈1,1〉, false),
ballots[〈1,2〉].vote(〈1,2〉, false)],
and it sends a batch with the sequence of messages [VOTE(b, false), b  〈1,3〉], which stands
for
[VOTE(〈0,⊥〉, false), VOTE(〈1,1〉, false), VOTE(〈1,2〉, false)].
In the second row of Figure 3, nodes v1, v2, and v4 start the timer with delay F (1), since
there exist ballot 〈1,1〉 and open interval [〈0,⊥〉, 〈1,1〉) such that the quorum {v1, v2, v4}
receives from itself a message VOTE(〈0,⊥〉, false), and [〈0,⊥〉, 〈1,1〉) is the singleton contain-
ing the null ballot 〈0,⊥〉 (lines 15–17 of Algorithm 2). This means that all correct nodes
receive from themselves vote messages that support preparing ballots with rounds bigger
or equal than 1. In addition to this, nodes v1 and v2 send the batch [READY(b, false), b 
〈1,2〉], since they receive a message VOTE(b, false) for each b  〈1,2〉 from the quorum
{v1, v2, v3}, to which they belong (lines 7–9 of Algorithm 1). And similarly, node v4 sends
28 REFERENCES
a READY(〈0,⊥〉, false), since it receives the message VOTE(〈0,⊥〉, false) from all nodes, which
constitute a quorum to which v4 belongs. Notice that node v4 cannot send READY(〈1,1〉, false)
because no quorum to which v4 belongs exists that sends VOTE(〈1,1〉, false).
In the third row of of Figure 3, nodes v1, v2 and v4 deliver false for ballot 〈1,1〉, since
they receive the message READY(〈0,⊥〉, false) from the quorum {v1, v2, v4} to which they all
belong (lines 13–15 of Algorithm 1), which results in each of those nodes preparing ballot
〈1,1〉 and triggering lines 8–12 of Algorithm 2. Since the prepared ballot 〈1,1〉 reaches v4’s
candidate ballot, then v4 triggers the batched event vote-batch([〈1,1〉], true) and prepares a
batch with the message VOTE(〈1,1〉, true) that it will send later (lines 8–12 of Algorithm 2
and lines 3–6 of Algorithm 1). In addition to this, node v4 also prepares a batch with the
message READY(〈1,1〉, false) that it will also send later, since it receives READY(〈1,1〉, false)
from the v4-blocking set {v1, v2} (lines 10–12 of Algorithm 1). Recall that the rule in lines 10–
12 of Algorithm 1 allows a node to send a ready message with some Boolean even if the
node previously voted a different Boolean for the same ballot. Finally, node v4 sends the
two batches prepared before atomically.
In the fourth row of Figure 3, nodes v1, v2 and v4 deliver false for ballot 〈1,2〉, since
they receive a message READY(b, false) for each b  〈1,2〉 from the quorum {v1, v2, v4} to
which they all belong (lines 13–15 of Algorithm 1), which results in each of those nodes
preparing ballot 〈1,2〉 and triggering lines 8–12 of Algorithm 2. Since the prepared bal-
lot 〈1,2〉 exceeds v4’s candidate ballot, then v4 updates its candidate ballot to 〈1,2〉 and
triggers vote-batch([〈1,2〉], true), which results in v4 sending VOTE(〈1,2〉, true) (lines 8–12 of
Algorithm 2 and lines 3–6 of Algorithm 1).
At this point no node can decide any value, because there exists not any ballot such that
a quorum of nodes votes true for it, and the timeouts of all correct nodes will expire after
F (1) time.
In the sixth row of Figure 3, nodes v1, v2 and v4 trigger timeout, and since they all
prepared ballot 〈1,2〉, they update their candidate ballot to 〈2,2〉 and trigger the batched
event vote-batch.([b, b  〈2,2〉], false) (lines 18–20 of Algorithm 2). Nodes v1, v2 and v4 send
the batch [VOTE(〈2,2〉, false), 〈1,3〉 ≤ b  〈2,2〉], which contains infinitely many messages
that are sent at once by BNS.
In the seventh row of Figure 3, nodes v1, v2 and v4 start the timer with delay F (2), since
there exist ballot 〈2,2〉 and open interval [〈1,2〉, 〈2,2〉) such that the quorum {v1, v2, v4} re-
ceives from itself the infinitely many messages VOTE(b, false) with b ∈ [〈1,2〉, 〈2,2〉) (lines 15–
17 of Algorithm 2), which are received at once by BNS. This means that all correct nodes
receive from themselves vote messages that support preparing ballots with rounds bigger or
equal than 2. Then, nodes v1, v2 and v4 send the batch [READY(b, false), 〈1,3〉 ≤ b  〈2,2〉],
since they receive a message VOTE(b, false) for each b such that 〈1,3〉 ≤ b  〈2,2〉 from the
quorum {v1, v2, v3} to which they belong (lines 7–9 of Algorithm 1). The batch contains
infinitely many messages, which are sent at once by BNS.
In the eight row of Figure 3, nodes v1, v2 and v4 trigger vote-batch(b, 〈1,3〉 ≤ b 
〈2,2〉], false), which stands for a vote false for each b below and incompatible than 〈2,2〉
for which the node didn’t vote any Boolean yet, since they receive a message READY(b, false)
for each of such b’s from the quorum {v1, v2, v4} to which they all belong (lines 13–15 of
Algorithm 1). Since the prepared ballot 〈2,2〉 reaches the candidate ballot of all correct
nodes, they trigger the event vote-batch([〈2,2〉], true) and send a VOTE(〈2,2〉, true) (lines 8–
12 of Algorithm 2 and lines 3–6 of Algorithm 1).
In the ninth row of Figure 3, nodes v1, v2 and v4 send the batch [READY(〈2,2〉, true)],
since they all received VOTE(〈2,2〉, true) from the quorum {v1, v2, v4} to which all belong
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(lines 7–9 of Algorithm 1).
Finally, in the tenth row of Figure 3, nodes v1, v2 and v4 trigger deliver-batch([〈2,2〉], true),
since they all received READY(〈2,2〉, true) from the quorum {v1, v2, v4} to which all belong
(lines 13–15 of Algorithm 1), and they all decide value 2 and end the execution.
D Proofs in §6
◮ Definition 31. We define φ(τ) = max{b | ∀b′  b. v.b′.deliver(false) ∈ τ} and let op ∈
{send, receive} and M ∈ {VOTE, READY}.
σ([ ]) = [ ]
σ(τ · [v.prepare(b)]) = σ(τ) · v.vote-batch([b′, b′  b], false)
σ(τ · [v.commit(b)]) = σ(τ) · v.vote-batch([b′, φ(σ(τ)) < b′ ≤ b], true)
σ(τ · [v.prepared(b)]) = σ(τ) · v.deliver-batch([b′, b′  b
∧ ∀v.deliver-batch(bs) ∈ σ(τ). (b′, false) 6∈ bs], false)
σ(τ · [v.committed(b)]) = σ(τ) · deliver-batch([b], true)
σ(τ · [v.op(VOTE(prep b), u)]) = σ(τ) · v.op-batch([M(b′, false), b′  b
∧ ∀a ∈ Bool. ∀v.op-batch(ms, u) ∈ σ(τ). M(b′, a) 6∈ ms], u)
σ(τ · [v.op(READY(prep b), u)]) = σ(τ) · v.op-batch([M(b′, false), b′  b
∧ ∀v.op-batch(ms, u) ∈ σ(τ). M(b′, false) 6∈ ms], u)
σ(τ · [v.op(VOTE(cmt b), u)]) = σ(τ) · v.op-batch([VOTE(b′, true), φ(σ(τ)) < b′ ≤ b], u)
σ(τ · [v.op(READY(cmt b), u)]) = σ(τ) · v.op-batch([READY(b, true)], u)
σ(τ · [e]) = σ(τ) · [e] otherwise
◮ Lemma 32. Let S be an FBQS with some intact set I, v be a node with v ∈ I, and τ be a
trace entailed by an execution of CSCP. If σ(τ) is a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP,
then v.round, v.prepared, and v.candidate coincide in both executions.
Proof. We prove the statement by induction on τ . For the base case, it suffices to observe,
that candidate, prepared, and round coincide when initialised in line 3 and 4 of Algorithm 4
and line 3 and 4 of Algorithm 2. For the step case τ = τ ′ · e we consider only the interesting
cases, where candidate, prepared, or round are modified in line 6, line 11, line 16, line 19,
and line 20 of Algorithm 4. For the other events in the concrete trace τ , the fields are not
modified and the statement holds.
Case e = v.propose(x): By definition σ(τ) contains v.propose(x), and by line 6 of Al-
gorithm 4 and by line 6 of Algorithm 2, candidate coincides.
Case e = prepared(b): By definition σ(τ) contains v.deliver-batch([b′, b′  b], false). By
induction hypothesis prepared coincide, and therefore prepared < b. Then by line 9
of Algorithm 4 and by line 9 of Algorithm 2, prepared coincides. Again, by induc-
tion hypothesis candidate coincides, and therefore candidate ≤ prepared coincides. If
candidate ≤ prepared holds then by line 11 of Algorithm 4 and by line 11 of Algorithm 2,
candidate coincides.
Case e = start-timer(n): By line 15 of Algorithm 4 τ ′ contains v.receive(Mu(su bu), u) from
u with su ∈ {cmt, prep} for a U ∈ Q such that v ∈ U and for each u ∈ U exists
Mu ∈ {VOTE, READY} and bu ∈ Ballot such that round < bu.n.
Sub-case Mu(prep bu). By definition σ(τ ′) contains a batch with Mu(b′u, false) for every
b′u  bu and every Mu(prep bu).
Sub-case Mu(cmt bu). By definition σ(τ ′) contains a batch with Mu(bu, true) for every
Mu(cmt bu).
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By induction hypothesis, round and therefore round < bu.n coincides. By line 16 of
Algorithm 4 and by line 16 of Algorithm 2, round coincides.
Case e = timeout: By definition σ(τ) contains v.timeout, and by induction hypothesis
candidate, prepared, and round coincide. Then by line 19 and 20 of Algorithm 4 and
line 19 and 20 of Algorithm 2, candidate, prepared, and round coincide.
◭
◮ Lemma 33. Let S be an FBQS with some intact set I, v be a node with v ∈ I, and τ be
a trace entailed by an execution of CSCP. Then for every ballot b ∈ v.ballots-delivered-cmt
(respectively, b ∈ v.ballots-readied-cmt) holds b ≤ v.max-delivered-prep (respectively, b ≤
v.max-delivered-prep).
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction, that there is a ballot b ∈ ballots-delivered-cmt (re-
spectively, b ∈ v.ballots-readied-cmt) such that b > max-delivered-prep (respectively, b >
v.max-delivered-prep). This is only possible, if v sent READY(prep b′) and READY(cmt b) to
itself where b′ < b (lines 15 and 16, and lines 27 and 28 of Algorithm 3). But then v sent
contradicting messages, which contradicts that v ∈ I. ◭
◮ Lemma 34. Let S be an FBQS with some intact set I, v be a node with v ∈ I, and τ be a
trace entailed by an execution of CSCP. If σ(τ) is a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP,
for every b > v.max-delivered-prep holds v.brs[b].delivered is false.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction, that v.brs[b].delivered is true. By lines 13–15 of Al-
gorithm 1 this is only possible if σ(τ) contains an event v.send-batch(ms, u) with READY(b, a) ∈
ms for a ∈ {true, false} from every u in a quorum U . Assume READY(b, true) ∈ ms.
Then by definition σ(τ) contains v.send(READY(cmt b), u) and by lines 27 and 28 of Al-
gorithm 3, b ∈ v.ballots-delivered-cmt. But then b ≤ v.max-delivered-prep by Lemma 33. As
b > v.max-delivered-prep, σ(τ) contains an event v.send-batch(ms, u) with READY(b, false) ∈
ms and by lines 13–15 of Algorithm 1 this is only possible if σ(τ) contains an event
v.send-batch(ms, u) where READY(b, false) ∈ ms from every node u in a quorum U where v ∈
U . Again, by definition of σ and BNS this entails that τ contains v.receive(READY(prep bu), u)
for b′  bu for every b′  b. But then, by lines 14 and 15 of Algorithm 3, v.max-delivered-prep
is assigned to b and this contradicts b > v.max-delivered-prep. ◭
◮ Lemma 35. Let S be an FBQS with some intact set I, v be a node with v ∈ I, and τ be a
trace entailed by an execution of CSCP. If σ(τ) is a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP,
for every b > v.max-readied-prep holds v.brs[b].ready is false.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction, that v.brs[b].ready is true. By lines 7–9 and lines 10–
12 of Algorithm 1 this is only possible if σ(τ) contains an event v.send-batch(ms, u) with
READY(b, a) ∈ ms for a ∈ {true, false} for every u in either a quorum U or a v-blocking set B.
Assume READY(b, true) ∈ ms. Then by definition σ(τ) contains v.send(READY(cmt b), u) for
every u and by lines 8 and 9, or lines 11 and 12 of Algorithm 3, b ∈ v.ballots-readied-cmt.
But then b ≤ v.max-readied-prep by Lemma 33. As b > v.max-readied-prep, σ(τ) contains
an event v.send-batch(ms, u) with READY(b, false) ∈ ms for every u in either a quorum U or
a v-blocking set B. Assume READY(b, true) ∈ ms. Then again, by definition of σ and BNS
this entails that τ contains v.receive(READY(prep bu), u) for b′  bu for every b′  b for every
u in either a quorum U or a v-blocking set B. But then, by lines 8 and 9, or lines 11 and
12 of Algorithm 4 of Algorithm 3, v.max-readied-prep is assigned to b and this contradicts
b > v.max-readied-prep. ◭
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◮ Lemma 36. Let S be an FBQS with some intact set I, v be a node with v ∈ I, and τ be a
trace entailed by an execution of CSCP. If σ(τ) is a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP
and b 6∈ ballots-delivered-cmt then b.delivered is false.
Proof. Assumes towards a contradiction that b.delivered is true. By lines 13–15 of Al-
gorithm 1 and BNS, this is only possible if σ(τ) contains an event v.receive-batch(ms, u)
with READY(b, a) ∈ ms for a ∈ {true, false} from a quorum U such that v ∈ U . If a is true,
then by definition of σ, τ contains v.receive(READY(cmt b), u) from a quorum U such that
v ∈ U . By lines 27 and 28 in Algorithm 4, b ∈ ballots-delivered-cmt and this contradicts
b 6∈ ballots-delivered-cmt. If a is false, then v.receive(READY(prep bu), u) from a quorum U
such that v ∈ U and b′  bu for every b′  b. Then by lines 14 and 15 of Algorithm 3,
max-delivered-prep is assigned to b and b.delivered is true contradicts Lemma 34. ◭
◮ Lemma 37. Let S be an FBQS with some intact set I and τ be a trace entailed by
an execution of CSCP. For every finite prefix τ ′ of the projected trace τ |I , the simulated
ρ′ = σ(τ ′) is the prefix of a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of τ ′. The case τ ′ = [ ] is trivial since
σ([ ]) = [ ] is the prefix of any trace. We let τ ′ = τ ′1 · [e] and consider the following cases:
Case e = v.prepare(b): For any execution of the CSCP with trace τ ′1, the prefix τ
′
1 contains
either the event v.propose(b.x) by lines 5 and 7 of Algorithm 4, or the event v.timeout
by lines 18 and 21 of Algorithm 4. The definition of σ entails that the simulated prefix
ρ′1 = σ(τ
′
1) contains either v.propose(b.x) or v.timeout. By the induction hypothesis, the
simulated prefix ρ′1 is entailed by an execution of ASCP. Let the subtrace that simulates
event e be ρ′e = v.vote-batch([b
′, b′  b], false). We show that ρ′1 · ρ
′
e is the prefix of a
trace entailed by an execution of ASCP.
Sub-case v proposes b.x. By lines 5–7 of Algorithm 2, v triggers v.b′.vote(false) for
every b′  〈1, b.x〉 is in the execution of ASCP.
Sub-case v triggers timeout By line 21 of Algorithm 4 ballot b equals candidate and
by Lemma 32 candidate coincides. By lines 18–21 of Algorithm 2, v.b′.vote(false) for
every b′  b is in the execution of ASCP.
As v triggered vote(false) for every b′  b in both cases. When batched, this results in
the event vote-batch([b′, b′  b], false), and ρ′1 · ρ
′
e is the prefix of a trace entailed by an
execution of ASCP.
Case v.commit(b). By lines 8 and 12 of Algorithm 4, for any execution of CSCP with
trace τ ′, the prefix τ ′1 contains the event v.prepared(b). The definition of σ entails that
the simulated prefix ρ′1 = σ(τ
′
1) contains the event v.deliver-batch([b
′, b′  b], false). By
the induction hypothesis, the simulated prefix ρ′1 is entailed by an execution of ASCP.
Let the subtrace that simulates event e be ρ′e = v.vote-batch([b
′′, φ(τ ′1) < b
′′ ≤ b], true).
We show that ρ′1 · ρ
′
e is the prefix of a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP. Fix a
ballot b′′ where φ(τ ′1) < b
′′ ≤ b. By definition φ(τ ′1) equals prepared and for every b
′′ holds
prepared < b′′. Since ρ′1 contains the event v.deliver-batch([bi, b
′  b], false), v triggered
b′.deliver(false) for each b′  b, and candidate and prepared coincide by Lemma 32, the
guard at line 8 of Algorithm 2 holds after any of such executions of ASCP. We can reason
in the same fashion for every b′′ in φ(τ ′1) < b
′′ ≤ b. By processing b′′ in increasing order
of ballots, candidate increases monotonically and triggers v.vote(b′′, true) for every ballot
b′′. As v triggered vote(b′′, true) for every φ(τ ′1) < b
′′ ≤ b. When batched, this results in
the event v.vote-batch([b′′, φ(τ ′1) < b
′′ ≤ b], true), and therefore ρ′1 · ρ
′
e is the prefix of a
trace entailed by an execution of ASCP.
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Case e = v.prepared(b). By lines 14 and 16 of Algorithm 3, for any execution of CSCP
with trace τ ′ there exists a maximum b such b > max-delivered-prep and a quorum
U that contains node v and for each u ∈ U node v received READY(prep bu) where
b′  bu for every b′  b. Therefore the prefix τ ′1 contains for every u ∈ U the
event v.receive(READY(prep bu), u). The definition of σ entails that the simulated pre-
fix ρ′1 = σ(τ
′
1) contains the event v.receive-batch([READY(b
′
u, false), b
′
u  bu], u) for each
v.receive(READY(prep bu), u) that occurs in τ ′1. By the induction hypothesis, the simu-
lated prefix ρ′1 is entailed by an execution of ASCP. Let the subtrace that simulates event
e be ρ′e = v.deliver-batch([b
′′, b′′  b ∧ ∀v.deliver-batch(bs) ∈ σ(τ). (b′, false) 6∈ bs], false).
We show that ρ′1 · ρ
′
e is the prefix of a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP. Fix a bal-
lot b′′ where b′′  b and there is no batch v.deliverBatch(bs, false) with b′′ ∈ bs in ρ′1. For
each node u ∈ U , we know that ρ′1 contains an event v.receive-batch([READY(b
′
u, false), b
′
u 
bu], u). As for every b′  b we know b′  bu, we have b′′  bu. Thus and by BNS, we know
that v received READY(b′′, false) from u. By Lemma 34 and by b > max-delivered-prep,
we know that b′.delivered is false. Therefore, by lines 13–15 of Algorithm 1, triggers
v.b′.deliver(b′, false). We can reason in the same fashion for every ballot b′ and batch the
delivers in the event v.deliver-batch([b′′, b′′  b ∧ ∀v.deliver-batch(bs) ∈ σ(τ). (b′, false) 6∈
bs], false), and therefore ρ′1 · ρ
′
e is the prefix of a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP.
Case e = v.committed(b): By lines 27 and 29 of Algorithm 3, for any execution of CSCP
with trace τ ′1, there exists a quorum U that contains node v which is such that v receives
READY(cmt b) from every u in U and b 6∈ ballots-delivered-cmt. The definition of σ entails
that the simulated prefix ρ′1 = σ(τ
′
1) contains an event v.receive-batch([READY(b, true)], u)
for each v.receive(READY(cmt b), u) that occurs in τ ′1. By the induction hypothesis, the
simulated prefix ρ′1 is entailed by an execution of ASCP. Let the subtrace that simulates
the event e be ρ′e = v.deliver-batch([b], true). We show that ρ
′
1 · ρ
′
e is the prefix of trace
entailed by an execution of ASCP. As v received READY(b, true) from a quorum U where
v ∈ U . As b 6∈ delivered by Lemma 36 deliver is false, and by lines 7 and 9 of Algorithm 1
triggers v.deliver(b, true). When batched, this results in the event v.deliver-batch([b], true),
and therefore ρ′1 · ρ
′
e is the prefix of a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP.
Case e = v.send(VOTE(prep b), u). By lines 4 and 7 of Algorithm 3, for any execution of
CSCP with trace τ ′, the prefix τ ′1 contains the event v.prepare(b). The definition of σ en-
tails that the simulated prefix ρ′1 = σ(τ
′
1) contains the event v.vote-batch([b
′, b′  b], false).
By the induction hypothesis, the simulated prefix ρ′1 is a trace entailed by an execution of
ASCP. Let the subtrace that simulates event e be ρ′e = v.send-batch([VOTE(b
′, false), b′  b∧
∀a ∈ Bool. ∀v.send-batch(ms, u) ∈ σ(τ). M(b′, a) 6∈ ms], u). We show that ρ′1 · ρ
′
e is the
prefix of a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP. Fix a ballot b′  b such that ρ′1 does
not contain the an event v.send-batch(ms, u) with VOTE(b′, false) ∈ ms. Then by lines 2
and 5 of Algorithm 1 we know that the Boolean voted is false. Hence, the condition in
line 4 of the same figure is satisfied, and since v.vote-batch([b′, b′  b], false), v triggered
b′.vote(false), appending v.send-batch(ms, u) with VOTE(b′, false) ∈ ms results in a trace
entailed by an execution of ASCP by line 6 of the same figure. We can reason in the
same fashion for every ballot b′  b and conclude together with BNS that ρ′1 · ρ
′
e is the
prefix of a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP.
Case e = v.receive(VOTE(prep b), u). By assumption the network does not create or drop
messages, hence v receives VOTE(prep b) only after u previously sent the same message
and the prefix τ ′1 contains the event u.send(VOTE(prep b), v). The definition of σ entails
that the simulated prefix ρ′1 = σ(τ
′
1) contains an event with u.send-batch([VOTE(b
′, a), b′ 
b], v) for a ∈ Bool. By the induction hypothesis, the simulated prefix ρ′1 is entailed by
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an execution of ASCP. Let the subtrace that simulates event e be
ρ′e = v.receive-batch([VOTE(b
′, false), b′  b
∧ ∀a ∈ Bool. ∀v.receive-batch(ms, u) ∈ σ(τ). VOTE(b′, a) 6∈ ms], u)
We show that ρ′1 · ρ
′
e is the prefix of a trace entailed by an execution ASCP. By the
ascending-ballot-order convention, it is enough to show that each b′  b, v receives a
batch with VOTE(b′, a) for a ∈ Bool exactly once in ρ′. For a fixed b′, an event with
v.receive-batch(ms, u) with VOTE(b′, false) ∈ ms is in ρ′e only if v.b
′.receive(VOTE(b′, a), u)
is not in ρ′1. On the other hand, u sent a batch event with u.b
′.send(VOTE(b′, a), v) for
each b′  b. Hence, ρ′1 · ρ
′
e is the prefix of a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP.
Case e = v.send(READY(prep b), u). For any execution of the CSCP with trace τ ′1, the
node v sends READY(prep b) either after hearing from a quorum in line 10 of Algorithm 3,
or after hearing from a v-blocking set in line 13 of the same figure. We consider both
cases:
Sub-case v sends READY(prep b) after hearing from a quorum. By lines 8–10 of Al-
gorithm 3, exists a maximum ballot b such that max-readied-prep < b and there
exists a quorum U such that v ∈ U and for every node u ∈ U the node v received
VOTE(prep bu) where b′  bu for every b′  b. The definition of σ entails that the
simulated prefix ρ′1 = σ(τ
′
1) contains an event with v.receive-batch([VOTE(b
′
u, a), b
′
u 
bu ∧ ∀a ∈ Bool. ∀v.receive-batch(ms, u) ∈ σ(τ). VOTE(b′u, a) 6∈ ms], u) for each node
u ∈ U and each event v.receive(VOTE(prep bu), u). By the induction hypothesis, the
simulated prefix ρ′1 is a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP. Let the subtrace that
simulates event e be ρ′e = v.send-batch([READY(b
′, false), b′  b∧∀v.send-batch(ms, u) ∈
σ(τ). READY(b′, false) 6∈ ms], u). We show that ρ′1 ·ρ
′
e is the prefix of a trace entailed by
an execution of ASCP. If b.n = 1 then by bmaximal and b  bu, v received a batch with
b′.VOTE(b′, false) for b′  b from every u ∈ U such that v ∈ U . Then, by lines 7–9 in Al-
gorithm 1, by BNS a batch with READY(bj , false) is in ρ′1. If b.n > 1, and as v is correct,
by lines 18–21 and lines 8–17 of Algorithm 4 v prepared the ballot bvp = 〈b.n− 1, b
v.x〉
in the previous round. By lines 14–16 of Algorithm 3, v sends READY(prep bvp). Hence
by definition of σ, a batch with READY(bj , a) is in ρ′1 for every bj  b
v
p. It remains to
show that a batch with v.send-batch([READY(bj, false), bpv < bj < b], u) is in ρ
′
1 · ρ
′
e. By
assumption, for each node u and b′u  bu the node v received VOTE(b
′
u, a). It suffices
to show that the node v receives VOTE(bj , false) from every u ∈ U for every ballot bj .
Then, by lines 7–9 and BNS in Algorithm 1 a batch with READY(bj , false) is in ρ′1. By
Lemma 35 and b′ > b > max-readied-prep, ready is false for b′.
Sub-case v sends READY(prep b) after hearing from a v-blocking set. By lines 11–13
of Algorithm 3 there exists a maximum ballot b such that max-readied-prep < b
and there exists a v-blocking set B such that for every u ∈ B the node v received
READY(prep bu) where b′  bu for every b′  b. The definition of σ entails that the
simulated prefix ρ′1 = σ(τ
′
1) contains an event v.receive-batch([READY(b
′
u, false), b
′
u 
bu], u) for each node u ∈ B and each event v.receive(READY(prep bu), u). By the
induction hypothesis, the simulated prefix ρ′1 is entailed by an execution of ASCP.
Let the subtrace that simulates event e be ρ′e = v.send-batch([READY(b
′, false), b′ 
b ∧ ∀v.send-batch(ms, u) ∈ σ(τ). READY(b′, false) 6∈ ms], u). Fix a ballot b′′ ∈ B such
that b′′  b and for a batch with v.b′′.send(READY(b′′, false), u) 6∈ σ(τ ′1). By Lemma 35
and b′′ > b > max-readied-prep, ready is false for b′′. We have to show that v received
READY(b′′, false) from every u in the v-blocking set B. Then by lines 10–12 in Al-
gorithm 1 v send READY(b′′, false) to u. As for every b′  b we know b′  bu, we have
b′′  bu. Thus, we know that a batch with READY(b′′, false) is in ρ′1.
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Both cases show that for the subtrace ρ′e that simulates event e, the trace ρ
′
1 · ρ
′
e is the
prefix of a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP.
Case e = v.receive(READY(prep b), u). Analogue to case v.receive(VOTE(prep b), u).
Case e = v.send(VOTE(cmt b), u). By lines 17 and 20 of Algorithm 3, for any execution
of CSCP with trace τ ′ the prefix τ ′1 contains the event v.commit(b). The definition of σ
entails that the simulated prefix ρ′1 = σ(τ
′
1) contains the event v.vote-batch([b
′, φ(ρ′1) <
b′ ≤ b], true). By the induction hypothesis, the simulated prefix ρ′1 is the prefix of a
trace entailed by an execution of ASCP. Let the subtrace that simulates event e be
ρ′e = v.send-batch([VOTE(b
′, true), φ(ρ′1) < b
′ ≤ b], u). We show that ρ′1 · ρ
′
e is the prefix
of a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP. Fix a ballot b′ such that ρ′1 does not
contain a v.send-batch(ms, u) with VOTE(b′, true) ∈ ms. By line 18 of Algorithm 3, we
know that b′ = max-voted-prep, and by lines 4–7 of the same figure, v did not send
VOTE(prep b′′) for any b′′ > max-voted-prep. By definition of σ, a batch event with
v.b′.send(VOTE(b′, false), u) 6∈ σ(τ) for b′ > b. As b 6∈ ballots-voted-cmt, again by definition
of σ, a batch event with v.b′.send(VOTE(b′, true), u) 6∈ σ(τ). Therefore we know that the
Boolean voted is false. Hence, the condition in line 4 of the same figure is satisfied. Since
v.vote-batch([b′, φ(ρ′1) < b
′ ≤ b], true), v triggered b′.vote(true), appending an event
v.send-batch(ms, u) with VOTE(b, true) ∈ ms results in the prefix of a trace entailed by
an execution of ASCP by line 6. We can reason in the same fashion for every b′ in
φ(σ(τ)) < b′ ≤ b, and therefore and by BNS ρ′1 · ρ
′
e is a trace entailed by an execution of
ASCP.
Case e = v.receive(VOTE(cmt b), u). By assumption the network does not create or drop
messages, hence v receives VOTE(cmt b) only after u previously sent the same message and
the prefix τ ′1 contains the event u.send(VOTE(cmt b), v). The definition of σ entails that
the simulated prefix ρ′1 = σ(τ
′
1) contains an event with u.send-batch([VOTE(b, false)], v).
By induction hypothesis ρ′1 is the prefix of a trace entailed an execution of ASCP. Let the
subtrace that simulates event e be ρ′e = v.receive-batch([VOTE(b
′, true), b′ ∈ {b′ | φ(ρ′1) <
b′ ≤ b}], u). We show that ρ′1 · ρ
′
e is the prefix of a trace entailed by an execution of
ASCP. As u sent VOTE(cmt b) to v, we know that v receives VOTE(b′, true) exactly once
for every b′ ∈ {b′ | φ(ρ′1) < b
′ ≤ b} and the batch is exactly once in ρ′. Hence, ρ′1 · ρ
′
e is
the prefix of a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP.
Case e = v.send(READY(cmt b), u). For any execution of CSCP with trace τ ′1, the node
v sends READY(cmt b) either after hearing from a quorum in line 23 of Algorithm 3, or
after hearing from a v-blocking set in line 26 of the same figure. We consider both cases:
Sub-case v sends READY(cmt b) after hearing from a quorum. By lines 21–23 of Al-
gorithm 3 there exists a quorum U such that v ∈ U and for every node u ∈ U the node v
received VOTE(cmt b) and b 6∈ readied and b > max-readied-prep. The definition of σ en-
tails that the simulated prefix ρ′1 = σ(τ
′
1) contains an event v.receive-batch([VOTE(b
′, a), φ(ρ′1) <
b′ ≤ b], u) and for every u ∈ U such that v ∈ U for every event v.receive(VOTE(cmt b), u).
By the induction hypothesis, the simulated prefix ρ′1 is a trace entailed by an execution
of ASCP. Let the subtrace that simulates event e be v.send-batch([READY(b, true)], u).
We show that ρ′1 · ρ
′
e is the prefix of a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP.
If v received VOTE(b, true) from a quorum U such that v ∈ U and readied in Al-
gorithm 1 is false, then by lines 7–9 in Algorithm 1, a batch with READY(b, true) is
in ρ′1. Assume a v.receive-batch(ms, u) with VOTE(b, false) ∈ ms is in ρ
′
1. By defin-
ition of σ this is only possible, if v received VOTE(prep bu) for some bu > b. As
v processed v.receive(VOTE(cmt b), u) and as v is correct, v cannot have processed
v.receive(READY(prep bu), u). Hence v received VOTE(b, true) from u, and as v has not
received VOTE(b, false), readied in Algorithm 1 is false.
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Sub-case v sends READY(cmt b) after hearing from a v-blocking set. By lines 24–26
of Algorithm 3 there exists a maximum ballot b and a v-blocking set B such that v re-
ceived READY(cmt b) from every node u ∈ B and b 6∈ readied and b > max-readied-prep.
The definition of σ entails that the simulated prefix ρ′1 = σ(τ
′
1) contains the event
v.b.receive(READY(b, a), u) for a ∈ {true, false} for every u ∈ B. By the induction
hypothesis, ρ′1 is the prefix of a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP. Let the sub-
trace that simulates e be v.send-batch([READY(b, true)], u). We show that ρ′1 · ρ
′
e is the
prefix of a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP. We have to show that v received
READY(b, true) from a v-blocking set B and readied in Algorithm 1 is false. Then by
lines 10–12 in Algorithm 1, v.send-batch(ms, u) with READY(b, true) is in ρ′1. Assume
v received READY(b, false) from u. By definition of σ this is only possible, if v received
READY(prep bu) for some bu > b. As v processed v.receive(READY(cmt b), u) and as
v is correct, v cannot have processed v.receive(READY(prep bu), u). Hence v received
READY(b, true) from u, and as v has not received VOTE(b, false), readied in Algorithm 1
is false.
Both cases show that for the subtrace ρ′e that simulates event e, the trace ρ
′
1 · ρ
′
e is the
prefix of a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP.
Case e = v.receive(READY(cmt b), u). Analogue to case v.receive(VOTE(cmt b), u).
Case e = v.propose(x). Straightforward by definition of σ, since τ contains v.propose(x)
iff the simulated ρ = σ(τ) contains v.propose(x).
Case e = v.decide(x). By lines 13–14 in Algorithm 4, for any execution of CSCP with
trace τ ′ the node v decides value x only after v triggers committed(b) for a ballot b with
b.x = x. The definition of σ entails that the simulated prefix ρ′1 = σ(τ
′
1) contains
the event v.deliver-batch([b], true). By induction hypothesis ρ′1, the simulated prefix
ρ′1 is entailed by an execution of ASCP. Let the subtrace that simulates event e be
ρ′e = [v.decide(x)]. We show that ρ
′
1 · ρ
′
e is the prefix of a trace entailed by an execution
of ASCP. As v.deliver-batch([b], true), v triggered deliver(true) for ballot b, by lines 13
and 14 of Algorithm 2, v.decide(x) is in the execution of ASCP and ρ′1 · ρ
′
e is the prefix
of a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP.
Case e = v.start-timer(n): By lines 15–17 of Algorithm 4 for any execution of CSCP with
trace τ ′1, there exists a quorum U which is such that v receives M(s bu) where M ∈
{VOTE, READY} and s ∈ {cmt, prep} from every u in U and round < bu.n. The definition
of σ entails that the simulated prefix ρ′1 = σ(τ
′
1) contains the event
v.receive-batch([M(b′, false), b′  bu], u)
for every v.receive(M(prep bu), u) that occurs in τ ′1, or v.receive-batch([M(bu, true)], u) for
every v.receive(M(cmt bu), u) that occurs in τ ′1. By induction hypothesis ρ
′
1 is the prefix
of a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP. Let the subtrace that simulates the event
e be ρ′e = [v.start-timer(n)]. We show that ρ
′
1 · ρ
′
e is the prefix of trace entailed by an
execution of ASCP. By Lemma 32 coincides round and by assumption n < bu.round holds.
We have distinguish two cases:
Sub-case v received M(prep bu) from u. The definition of σ entails that the simulated
prefix ρ′1 = σ(τ
′
1) contains an event with v.receive-batch([Mu(b
′
u, false), b
′
u  bu], u) and
every Mu(prep bu).
Sub-case Mu(cmt bu). The definition of σ entails that the simulated prefix ρ′1 = σ(τ
′
1)
contains a v.receive-batch([Mu(bu, true)], u) for every Mu(cmt bu).
Combining the cases leads to the conditions in line 15 in Algorithm 2 satisfied. Thus, by
line 17 of the same figure, v.start-timer(n) is in the execution of ASCP and ρ′1 · ρ
′
e is the
prefix of a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP.
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Case e = v.timeout: Straightforward by definition of σ, since τ contains v.timeout iff the
simulated ρ = σ(τ) contains v.timeout. ◭
Proof of Theorem 14. Let τ be the trace entailed by an execution of CSCP over S. We
prove that there exists a trace ρ entailed by an execution of ASCP such that H(τ |I) =
H(ρ|I) by reductio ad absurdum. Assume towards a contradiction that for all traces ρ, if
H(τ |I) = H(ρ|I) then ρ is not a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP. Fix the trace ρ to
be σ(τ |I ), which entails that H(τ |I) = H(ρ|I) by definition of σ and H . Since the number
of events in a trace entailed by ASCP is bounded by ω, we denote the ith event of ρ as
ei, with i a natural number. Since ρ is not a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP by
assumptions, there exists i ≥ 0 such that the prefix [ei, . . . , ei] of ρ is a trace entailed by
ASCP, but the prefix [e0, . . . , ei+1] of ρ is not a trace entailed by ASCP. Since σ maps one
event of a concrete trace into one event of an abstract trace, there exists a finite prefix τ ′
of τ |I such that σ(τ ′) = [e0, . . . , ei+1]. But this leads to a contradiction because σ(τ ′) is a
trace of an execution of ASCP by Lemma 37. Therefore, there exists a trace ρ entailed by
an execution of ASCP such that H(τ |I) = H(ρ|I), and we are done. ◭
Proof of Corollary 15. Let τ be the trace entailed by an execution of CSCP over S. Assume
towards a contradiction that the execution does not satisfy some of the properties of Integrity,
Agreement for intact sets, Weak validity for intact sets, or Non-blocking for intact sets. By
Theorem 14, there exists a trace ρ entailed by an execution of ASCP over S and such that
H(τ |I) = H(ρ|I). By definition of history, H(τ |I) and H(ρ|I) coincide in their respective
propose and decide events. Since ρ|I is entailed by an execution of ASCP, this execution
fails to satisfy some of the properties of Integrity, Agreement for intact sets, Weak validity
for intact sets, or Non-blocking for intact sets, which contradicts Theorem 13. ◭
Recall Example 30 in Appendix C. Compare the execution of ASCP in Figure 3 with
infinitely many events and messages with the finite execution of CSCP in Figure 4. The
nodes propose the same values as in Example 30. In particular, in the first row, the faulty
node v3 sends VOTE(prep 〈1,2〉) to every correct node. As in ASCP every correct node
starts a timer in the second row. As in ASCP node v4 has prepared 〈1,1〉 and sends
READY(prep 〈1,1〉) after receiving VOTE(prep bu) from a quorum for bu ∈ {〈1,2〉, 〈1,3〉}
where b′ ∈ {〈0,⊥〉} and b′  bu (lines 8–10 of Algorithm 3). In the third row, the nodes v1,
v2 and v4 prepare the maximum ballot 〈1,1〉, as they received READY(prep bu) from a quorum
for bu ∈ {〈1,1〉, 〈1,2〉} where b′ ∈ {〈0,⊥〉} and b′  bu (lines 14–10 of Algorithm 3). Now
node v4 reaches its candidate value 〈1,1〉 and therefore votes for it. But at the same time, v4
receives READY(prep(〈1,2〉)) from the v4-blocking set {v1, v2} and sends READY(prep 〈1,2〉)
(lines 11–13 of Algorithm 3). In the fourth, node v4 only votes one commit statement
cmt 〈1,2〉, as opposed to voting true for the two ballots 〈1,1〉 and 〈1,2〉 in the fourth
row of Figure 3. Similar to Example 30, the correct nodes decide value 2, which was not
proposed by any correct node. As in Figure 4, at this point no node can decide any value,
because there is no ballot with a quorum of nodes for it, and the timeouts of all correct
nodes will expire after F (1) time. Then, in the sixth row of Figure 4, nodes v1, v2 and v4
trigger timeout, and since they all prepared ballot 〈1,2〉, they update their candidate ballot
to 〈2,2〉. Now v1, v2 and v4 have all the same candidate ballot and analogues to row six to
nine in of Figure 3 can execute CSCP to decide value 2 and end the execution.
For illustration, the executions in Figure 4 and 3 entail concrete and abstract traces τ and
ρ respectively, which consist of the events on the left of each cell when traversing the tables
in left-to-right, top-down fashion, and where the network events on the right of each cell are
REFERENCES 37
◮ Example 38.
Node v1 Node v2 Node v3 Node v4
propose(3)
brs.prepare(〈1,3〉)
VOTE(prep 〈1,3〉)
propose(3)
brs.prepare(〈1,3〉)
VOTE(prep 〈1,3〉)
VOTE(prep 〈1, 2〉) propose(1)
brs.prepare(〈1,1〉)
VOTE(prep 〈1,1〉)
start-timer(F (1))
READY(prep 〈1, 2〉)
start-timer(F (1))
READY(prep 〈1,2〉)
start-timer(F (1))
READY(prep 〈1,1〉)
brs.prepared(〈1,1〉) brs.prepared(〈1, 1〉) brs.prepared(〈1, 1〉)
brs.commit(〈1,1〉)
VOTE(cmt 〈1,1〉)
READY(prep 〈1,2〉)
brs.prepared(〈1,2〉) brs.prepared(〈1, 2〉) brs.prepared(〈1, 2〉)
brs.commit(〈1,2〉)
VOTE(cmt 〈1,2〉)
...
...
...
...
timeout
brs.prepare(〈2,2〉)
VOTE(prep 〈2,2〉)
timeout
brs.prepare(〈2,2〉)
VOTE(prep 〈2,2〉)
timeout
brs.prepare(〈2,2〉)
VOTE(prep 〈2,2〉)
start-timer(F (2))
READY(prep 〈2, 2〉)
start-timer(F (2))
READY(prep 〈2,2〉)
start-timer(F (2))
READY(prep 〈2,2〉)
brs.prepared(〈2,2〉)
brs.commit(〈2,2〉)
VOTE(cmt 〈2,2〉)
brs.prepared(〈2, 2〉)
brs.commit(〈2,2〉)
VOTE(cmt 〈2,2〉)
brs.prepared(〈2, 2〉)
brs.commit(〈2,2〉)
VOTE(cmt 〈2,2〉)
READY(cmt 〈2, 2〉) READY(cmt 〈2,2〉) READY(cmt 〈2,2〉)
brs.committed(〈2,2〉)
decide(2)
brs.committed(〈2,2〉)
decide(2)
brs.committed(〈2,2〉)
decide(2)
Figure 4 Execution of CSCP.
intermixed in such a way that the assumptions on atomic and batched semantics of §5 are
met. It is routine to check that H(τ |{1,2,4}) = H(ρ|{1,2,4}) and that ρ|{1,2,4} = σ(τ |{1,2,4}).
E Proofs in §7
Since in a subjective FBQS {Sv}v∈Vok each node v runs the consensus protocols according to
its own view Sv, the set of quorums Q in the pseudo-code of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2–4
coincides with the set of quorums in the view Sv. The notion of v-blocking set in these
figures also coincides with the usual notion in the view Sv. To fix terminology, we say that
U is a quorum known by v in a subjective FBQS {Sv}v∈Vok iff U is a quorum in v’s view
Sv, i.e., ∀v′ ∈ U. ∃q ∈ Sv(v′). q ⊆ U . We say that a set B is v-blocking in a subjective FBQS
{Sv}v∈Vok iff B overlaps each of v’s slices in v’s view Sv, i.e., ∀q ∈ Sv(v). q ∩B 6= ∅.
Proof of Lemma 16. Since the nodes in I are correct, they never equivocate their quorum
slices, and thus I is a quorum in each view Sv with v ∈ I iff I is a quorum in {Sv}v∈Vok .
For the same reason, all the views Sv|I with v ∈ I coincide with each other. Thus, every
node in I is intertwined with each other in the all the views Sv with v ∈ I iff every node in
I is intertwined with each other in {Sv}v∈Vok , and the lemma holds. ◭
Proof of Lemma 17. Since U1 and U2 are in
⋃
v∈Vok
Sv, there exist correct nodes v1 and
v2 such that U1 is a quorum known by v1 and U2 is a quorum known by v2. By Lemma 21
the sets U1 ∩ I and U2 ∩ I are quorums in Sv1 |I and Sv2 |I respectively. Since the nodes
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in I never equivocate their slices, all the views Sv|I with v ∈ I coincide with each other.
Since every node is intertwined with each other in such a view, every two quorums have
non-empty intersection by Lemma 22. Therefore, (U1 ∩ I) ∩ (U2 ∩ I) = (U1 ∩ U2) ∩ I 6= ∅,
and the intersection U1 ∩ U2 contains some node in I. ◭
◮ Lemma 39. Assume that Vok is the set of correct nodes and let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective
FBQS with some intact set I. Let v ∈ I. Then, no v-blocking set B exists such that B∩I = ∅.
Proof. Straightforward by the definition of v-blocking in {Sv}v∈Vok and by Lemma 5. ◭
◮ Lemma 40 (Analogous to Lemma 46 in [8] for intact sets). Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective
FBQS and t be a tag, and consider an execution of the instance for t of FV over {Sv}v∈Vok .
Let I be an intact set in {Sv}v∈Vok . The first node v ∈ I that sends a READY(t, a) message
first needs to receive a VOTE(t, a) message from every member of a quorum U known by v
and to which v belongs.
Proof. Let v be any node in I. By Lemma 39 no v-blocking set B exists such that B∩I = ∅.
Therefore, the first node v ∈ I that sends a READY(t, a) message does it through lines 7–9
of Algorithm 1, which means that v received VOTE(t, a) messages from every member of a
quorum U known by v and to which v belongs. ◭
◮ Lemma 41. Assume that Vok is the set of correct nodes and let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective
FBQS with some intact set I. Consider a set B of nodes. If B is not v-blocking in {Sv}v∈Vok
for any v ∈ I \B, then either B ⊇ I or I \B is a quorum in Sv|I for each v ∈ I.
Proof. Assume B is not v-blocking in {Sv}v∈Vok for any v ∈ I \ B. If B ⊇ I then we are
done. Otherwise, for every node v in I \B, there exists a slice q ∈ Sv(v) such that q∩B = ∅.
We know that q ∩ I 6= ∅ since v ∈ q by definition of subjective FBQS. We also know that
q ∩ I ∈ Sv|I(v) by definition of Sv|I , and since q ∩B = ∅, the intersection q ∩ I is a subset
of I \ B. Since for each node v ∈ I there exists a slice q ∈ Sv(v) such that q ∩ I is a subset
of I \ B, the set I \ B is a quorum in Sv|I . Since the nodes in I are correct and never
equivocate their slices, we know that Sv1 |I = Sv2 |I for every two nodes v1 and v2 in I, and
the required holds. ◭
◮ Lemma 42 (Analogous to Lemma 23 of [8] for intact sets). Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subject-
ive FBQS and consider an execution of ASCP over {Sv}v∈Vok . Let I be an intact set in
{Sv}v∈Vok and b be a ballot. If two nodes in I send respectively messages READY(b, a) and
READY(b, a′), then a = a′.
Proof. Assume that two nodes in I send respectively messages READY(b, a) and READY(b, a′).
By Lemma 40, some node v ∈ I has received VOTE(b, a) from a quorum U known by v to
which v belongs, and some node v′ ∈ I has received VOTE(b, a′) from a quorum U ′ known by
v′ to which v′ belongs. By Lemma 17, the intersection U ∩ U ′ contains some node in I, so
that this node has sent VOTE(t, a) and VOTE(t, a′). But due to the use of the guard variable
voted in lines 2 and 4–5 of Algorithm 1, a node can only vote for one value per tag, and thus
it cannot vote different values for the same tag. Hence, a = a′. ◭
◮ Lemma 43 (Analogous to Lemma 24 in [8] for intact sets). Assume that Vok is the set of
correct nodes and let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS with some intact set I. Assume that
I = V + ⊎V − and for some quorum U known by a node v we have U ∩ I ⊆ V +. Then either
V − = ∅ or there exists some node v′ ∈ V − such that V + is v′-blocking in {Sv}v∈Vok .
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Proof. Since every one in I is correct, all the views Sv|I with v ∈ I coincide with each
other. Since V + and V − only contain nodes in I, they both lie within the projection Sv|I .
Thus, for every v ∈ V +, V − is v-blocking in {Sv}v∈Vok iff V
− is v-blocking in any S′v|I with
v′ ∈ I. Assume that V + is not v-blocking in {Sv}v∈Vok for any v ∈ V
−. By Lemma 24,
either V − = ∅ or V − is a quorum in S|I . In the former case we are done, while in the
latter we get a contradiction as follows. By Lemma 21, the intersection U ∩ I is a quorum
in S|I . Since every two quorums in S|I have non-empty intersection by Lemma 22, we have
(U ∩ I) ∩ V − 6= ∅. But this is impossible, since U ∩ I ⊆ V + and V + ∩ V − = ∅. ◭
◮ Lemma 44. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS and t be a tag. The instance for t of
FV over {Sv}v∈Vok satisfies the specification of reliable Byzantine voting for intact sets.
Proof. We prove that the instance for tag t of FV over {Sv}v∈Vok enjoys each of the prop-
erties that define the specification of reliable Byzantine voting for intact sets.
No duplication: Straightforward by the use of the guard variable delivered in line 28 of
Algorithm 1.
Totality for intact sets: Assume some node v in I delivers a value a for tag t. By the
condition in line 7 of Algorithm 1, the node v has received READY(t, a) messages from
every member in a quorum U known by v. Since U ∩ I contains only correct nodes,
these nodes send READY(t, a) messages to every node. By the condition in line 10 of
Algorithm 1, any correct node v′ sends READY(t, a) messages if it receives READY(t, a)
from every member in a v′-blocking set. Hence, the READY(t, a) messages from the nodes
in U∩I may convince additional correct nodes to send READY(t, a) messages to every node.
Let these additional correct nodes send READY(t, a) messages until a point is reached at
which no further nodes in I can send READY(t, a) messages. At this point, let V + be the
set of nodes in I that sent READY(t, a) messages (where U∩I ⊆ V +), and let V − = I \V +.
By Lemma 42 the nodes in V − did not send any READY(t,_) messages at all. The set V +
cannot be v′-blocking for any node v′ in V −, or else more nodes in I could come to send
READY(t, a) messages. Then by Lemma 43 we have V − = ∅, meaning that every node in
I has sent READY(t, a) messages. Since I is a quorum known by every node in I, all the
nodes in I will eventually deliver a Boolean for tag t due to the condition in line 7 of
Algorithm 1.
Consistency for intertwined nodes: Assume that two nodes v and v′ in an intact set I deliver
values a and a′ for tag t respectively. By the condition in line 13, the nodes received
READY(t, a) messages from a quorum known by v, respectively, READY(t, a′) messages from
a quorum known by v′. Since the two nodes are intertwined, there is a correct node u
in the intersection of the two quorums, which sent both READY(t, a) and READY(t, a′). By
the use of the guard variable readied in line 7 of Algorithm 1, node u can only send one
and the same ready message to every other node, and thus a = a′ as required.
Validity for intact sets: Assume every node in an intact set I votes for value a. Since I is
a quorum known by every member of I, every node in I will eventually send READY(t, a)
by the condition in line 7 of Algorithm 1. By Lemma 42, these messages cannot carry a
value different from a. Then by the condition in line 13 of Algorithm 1 every node in I
will eventually deliver the value a for tag t. Due to Consistency for intact sets, no node
delivers a value different from a. ◭
◮ Lemma 45. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS and t be a tag, and consider an execution
of the instance for t of FV over {Sv}v∈Vok . Let I be an intact set in {Sv}v∈Vok and assume
that GST has expired. If a node v ∈ I delivers a voting value then every node in I will
deliver a voting value within some bounded time.
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Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 7. ◭
Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS and t be a tag, and consider an execution of the
instance for tag t of FV over {Sv}v∈Vok . Let I be an intact set in {Sv}v∈Vok . As we did in §4,
we write δI for the finite time that a node in I takes to deliver some voting value after GST
and provided that some other node in I already delivered some voting value. Lemma 45
guarantees that δI is finite.
◮ Lemma 46. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS and consider an execution of ASCP
over {Sv}v∈Vok . Let I be an intact set in {Sv}v∈Vok . If a node v1 ∈ I commits a ballot b,
then some node v2 ∈ I prepared b.
Proof. Assume that a node v1 ∈ I commits ballot b. By line 7 of Algorithm 1, node
v1 received READY(b, true) from every member of a quorum known by v1 and to which v1
belongs. By Lemma 40 the first node u ∈ I to do so received VOTE(b, true) messages from
every member of a quorum U known by u and to which u belongs. Since v1 is intertwined
with every other node in I, there exists a correct node v2 in the intersection U ∩ I that sent
VOTE(b, true). The node v2 can send VOTE(b, true) only through line 6 of Algorithm 1, which
means that v2 triggers brs[b].vote(true) in line 12 of Algorithm 2. By line 8 of the same
figure, this is only possible after v2 has aborted every b′  b, and the lemma holds. ◭
◮ Lemma 47. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS and consider an execution of ASCP
over {Sv}v∈Vok . Let I be an intact set in S. Let v1 and v2 be nodes in I and b1 and b2 be
ballots such that b2  b1. The following two things cannot both happen: node v1 prepares b1
and node v2 sends READY(b2, true).
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that v1 prepares b1, and that v2 sends READY(b2, true).
By definition of prepare, node v1 aborted every ballot b  b1. By line 7 of Algorithm 1,
node v2 received READY(b, false) from every member of a quorum Ub known by v1 for each
ballot b  b1. By assumptions, b2  b1, and therefore v1 received READY(b2, false) from every
member of the quorum Ub2 . By Lemma 39, the first node u1 ∈ I that sent READY(b2, false)
received VOTE(b2, false) from a quorum U1 known by u1 and to which u1 belongs. Since
v2 sent READY(b2, true) and by Lemma 39, the first node u2 ∈ I that sent READY(b2, true)
received VOTE(b2, true) from a quorum U2 known by u2 and to which u2 belongs. Since u1
and u2 are intertwined, the intersection U1 ∩ U2 contains some correct node v, which sent
both VOTE(b2, false) and VOTE(b2, true) messages. By the use of the Boolean voted in line 3
of Algorithm 1 this results in a contradiction and we are done. ◭
◮ Lemma 48. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS and consider an execution of ASCP
over {Sv}v∈Vok . Let I be an intact set in S. If a node v1 ∈ I commits a ballot b1, then the
largest ballot b2 prepared by any node v2 ∈ I before v1 commits b1 is such that b1 ∼ b2.
Proof. Assume node v1 commits ballot b1. By the guard in line 13 of Algorithm 1, node
v1 received the message READY(b1, true) from every member of a quorum known by v1 and
to which v1 belongs, which entails that node v1 received READY(b1, true) from itself. By
Lemma 40, the first node u ∈ I that send READY(b1, true) needs to receive an VOTE(b1, true)
message from every member of some quorum known by u and to which u belongs. Thus,
u itself triggered brs[b1].vote(true), which by lines 7 and 21 of Algorithm 2 means that u
prepared ballot b1. Hence, the largest ballot b2 such that there exists a node v2 ∈ I that
triggers brs[b2].vote(true) before v1 commits b1, is bigger or equal than b1. If b2 = b1,
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then b2.x = b1.x and by lines 8–12 of Algorithm 2, node v2 prepares b2 before it triggers
brs[b2].vote(true) and the lemma holds.
If b2 > b1, then we assume towards a contradiction that b2.x 6= b1.x. By lines 8–12 of
Algorithm 2, node v2 prepared b2. But this results in a contradiction by Lemma 47, because
v1 and v2 are intertwined and v1 sent READY(b1, true), but b1  b2. Therefore b2.x = b1.x,
and by lines 8–12 of Algorithm 2, node v2 prepares b2 before it triggers brs[b2].vote(true). ◭
The definition of ready-tree for Boolean a and ballot b at node v from Appendix C can
be lifted to the subjective FBQSs straightaway, since the definition assumes that all nodes
are honest, and thus they do not equivocate their quorum slices and all the views coincide
with each other.
◮ Lemma 49. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS b be a ballot, and consider an execution
of the instance for ballot b of FV over {Sv}v∈Vok . Assume all nodes are honest. If a node v
sends READY(b, a) then there exists a quorum U known by every node such that every member
of U sent VOTE(b, a).
Proof. Straightforward by Lemma 28, since all nodes are honest and thus all the views
coincide with each other. ◭
◮ Lemma 50. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS and consider an execution of ASCP
over {Sv}v∈Vok . Let b1 be the largest ballot prepared by some node v1 at some moment in
the execution. If all nodes are honest, then some node v2 proposed b1.x.
Proof. Straightforward by Lemma 50, since all nodes are honest and thus all the views
coincide with each other. ◭
◮ Lemma 51. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS and consider an execution of ASCP
over {Sv}v∈Vok . Let I be a maximal intact set in {Sv}v∈Vok and assume that GST has
expired. Let v be a node in I that prepares some ballot b such that no other node in I has
ever prepared a ballot with round bigger or equal than b.n. In the interval of duration δI
after u prepares b, every node in I that has not decided any value yet, either decides a value
or prepares a ballot with round b.n.
Proof. Since v has prepared b, then v has delivered false for every ballot bi  b. Let u ∈ I
be a node different from v that has not decided any value yet. By assumptions, node u has
neither prepared any ballot with round bigger or equal than b.n. Since GST has expired
and by Lemma 45, node u will deliver false for every ballot bi  b within δI , and the lemma
holds. ◭
Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS and consider an execution of ASCP over {Sv}v∈Vok .
Let I be an intact set in {Sv}v∈Vok . As in §5, we say the window for intact set I of round
n for the interval in which every node in an intact set I that has not decided any value
yet prepares a ballot of round n. As in Appendix C, we let vn be the first node in I that
ever prepares a ballot bn with round n. The definition of prepare-footprint of ballot bn from
Appendix C can be lifted to the subjective FBQSs straightaway, since the definition assumes
that all faulty nodes have stopped, and thus the remaining correct nodes agree on the slices
of every other correct node, and all the quorums that are not stopped belong to all the
views. We also distinguish the abort interval for intact set I of round n and the duration
δAnI , whose definitions can be lifted to subjective FBQSs straightaway. As in Appendix C
we may omit the ‘for intact set I’ qualifier when the intact set is clear from the context.
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◮ Lemma 52. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS and consider an execution of ASCP
over {Sv}v∈Vok . Let I be a maximal intact set in {Sv}v∈Vok and assume that all faulty
nodes eventually stop. There exists a round n such that either every node in I decides some
value before reaching round n, or otherwise the windows of all the rounds m ≥ n happen
consecutively and never overlap with each other, and in each of the consecutive windows of
round m the nodes in I that have not decided any value yet only prepare ballots with round
m.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 12. ◭
◮ Corollary 53. Let m ≥ n and let bmax be the maximum ballot prepared by any node in
I before the abort interval of round m + 1 starts. Every node in I prepares bmax before the
abort interval of round m+ 1 starts.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Corollary 29. ◭
Proof of Theorem 18. Analogous to the proof of Theorem 13, by using Lemmas 45–52 and
Corollary 53. ◭
◮ Lemma 54. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS with some intact set I, v be a node with
v ∈ I, and τ be a trace entailed by an execution of CSCP. If σ(τ) is a trace entailed by an
execution of ASCP, then v.round, v.prepared, and v.candidate coincide in both executions.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 32. ◭
◮ Lemma 55. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS with some intact set I, v be a node
with v ∈ I, and τ be a trace entailed by an execution of CSCP. Then for every ballot b ∈
v.ballots-delivered-cmt (respectively, b ∈ v.ballots-readied-cmt) holds b ≤ v.max-delivered-prep
(respectively, b ≤ v.max-delivered-prep).
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 33. ◭
◮ Lemma 56. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS with some intact set I, v be a node with
v ∈ I, and τ be a trace entailed by an execution of CSCP. If σ(τ) is a trace entailed by an
execution of ASCP, for every b > v.max-delivered-prep holds v.brs[b].delivered is false.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 34, by using Lemma 55. ◭
◮ Lemma 57. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS with some intact set I, v be a node with
v ∈ I, and τ be a trace entailed by an execution of CSCP. If σ(τ) is a trace entailed by an
execution of ASCP, for every b > v.max-readied-prep holds v.brs[b].ready is false.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 35, by using Lemma 55. ◭
◮ Lemma 58. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS with some intact set I, v be a node with
v ∈ I, and τ be a trace entailed by an execution of CSCP. If σ(τ) is a trace entailed by an
execution of ASCP and b 6∈ ballots-delivered-cmt then b.delivered is false.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 36, by using Lemma 56. ◭
◮ Lemma 59. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS with some intact set I and τ be a trace
entailed by an execution of CSCP. For every finite prefix τ ′ of the projected trace τ |I , the
simulated ρ′ = σ(τ ′) is the prefix of a trace entailed by an execution of ASCP in Algorithm 2.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 37, by using Lemmas 54–58. ◭
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Proof of Theorem 19. Analogous to the proof of Theorem 14, by using Lemma 59. ◭
Proof of Corollary 20. Analogous to the proof of Corollary 15, by using Theorem 19. ◭
